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The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’
Rights
Pascale Chapdelaine*
In this article, I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement
or users’ rights as they are laid out in Canada’s Copyright Act and in copyright
jurisprudence, as well as through their interaction with contracts and technological
protection measures [TPMs]. What is the significance of the Supreme Court of
Canada characterization of exceptions as users’ rights? Are exceptions to copyright infringement rights or privileges? Are they mandatory? While copyright
users’ rights and interests have triggered interest and debate amongst scholars,
relatively less attention has been given to defining their precise nature, and on the
consequences of the main characteristics of exceptions to copyright infringement
on copyright law and policy. I begin my analysis with four exceptions to copyright
infringement that were added to the Copyright Act in 2012 (i.e., the non-commercial user-generated content, the reproduction for private purposes, the later listening or viewing and the backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement) with a
particular focus on their relevance for consumers and their relation to pre-existing
users’ rights. I examine the interplay between the users’ rights set out in the Copyright Act and how they can be altered or overridden by non-negotiated standard
end-user agreements and TPMs. To this end, I refer to a sample of non-negotiated
standard terms of use for the online distribution of books, musical recordings and
films. I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, including
through Hohfeld’s theory of jural correlatives. I look at the policy considerations
behind these questions and conclude my article by reflecting on the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users’ rights on the coherence and, ultimately, the
legitimacy of copyright law.
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article was selected by blind peer review for the 6th Annual Junior Scholars in
Intellectual Property Workshop (Michigan State University, October 2013
<http://www.law.msu.edu/ipic/workshop/>). I thank the participants of the Workshop
for their detailed comments on an earlier version of this article, in particular: Pamela
Samuelson and Laura Heymann. I thank the Social Sciences Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and York University Osgoode Hall Law School, for their
generous financial support, making this research work possible. This article is based on
parts of my Ph.D. thesis in law (defended in June 2013). I thank Giuseppina
D’Agostino, David Vaver, David Lametti and Graeme Dinwoodie for their thoughtful
comments on earlier versions of this article as well as the participants of the seminar
held at the Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre in May 2013 on Canadian
Copyright Law, and the participants of the International Association for the
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) conference
held in Oxford in June 2013.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494035

2

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[26 I.P.J.]

Dans cet article, l’auteure examine la nature des exceptions à la violation du
droit d’auteur ou aux droits d’usage tels qu’ils sont énoncés dans la Loi sur le droit
d’auteur du Canada et dans la jurisprudence sur le droit d’auteur, ainsi que dans
leurs interactions avec les contrats et les mesures de protection technologiques.
Quelle est la signification de la caractérisation, par la Cour suprême du Canada,
des exceptions comme étant des droits d’usage? Les exceptions aux droits d’auteur
sont-elles des droits ou des privilèges? Sont-elles de caractère obligatoire? Alors
que les droits et les intérêts des usagers d’œuvres protégées ont suscité de
l’attention et engendré des débats académique, moins d’intérêt a été accordé à la
définition de leur nature précise et aux conséquences des principales caractéristiques des exceptions à la violation du droit d’auteur sur le droit et politiques relatifs
au droit d’auteur. L’auteure commence son analyse avec quatre exceptions à la
violation du droit d’auteur qui ont été ajoutées à la Loi sur le droit d’auteur en
2012 (c.-à-d., les exceptions à la violation du droit d’auteur relatives au contenu
non commercial généré par les utilisateurs, à la reproduction à des fins privées, à
l’écoute ou au visionnement en différé, et aux copies de sauvegarde) avec une attention particulière à leur pertinence pour les consommateurs et leur relation avec
les droits d’usage préexistants. Elle examine l’interaction entre les droits d’usage
établis dans la Loi sur le droit d’auteur et la façon dont ils peuvent être modifiés ou
remplacés par des ententes standards non négociées des utilisateurs finaux et des
mesures de protection technologiques. À cette fin, l’auteure fait référence à un
échantillonnage de conditions d’utilisation standards non négociées pour la distribution en ligne de livres, d’enregistrements musicaux et de films. Elle enquête sur
la nature des exceptions à la violation du droit d’auteur, notamment au moyen de
la théorie de Hohfeld sur les corrélations juridiques. Elle examine les considérations politiques derrière ces questions et conclut son article par une réflexion sur
les effets néfastes de la nature incertaine des droits d’usage sur la cohérence et
aussi la légitimité des lois et politiques en matière de droit d’auteur.

1. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in Canada and worldwide, signal a greater consideration
for the interests of users in copyright law and policy.1 As copyright progressively

1

Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [CMA], Preamble, states, with respect to
the exclusive rights of copyright holders, that “some limitations on those rights exist to
further enhance users’ access to copyright works or other subject-matter.” References
to copyright consumers’ concerns and interests were part of the Government of Canada’s consultations with the public and communications in the latest copyright reform
initiatives. See Government of Canada official website archives on Bill C-32, An Act to
amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Session, 40th Parl., 2010 (1st reading June 2, 2010):
“Copyright
Modernization
Act
Backgrounder,”
online:
<http://balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h_rp01151.html>. See also
Government of Canada official website on the adoption of Bill C-11, An Act to Amend
the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2011 (assented to June 29, 2012): “Copyright
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expanded in subject matter, duration and scope,2 exceptions to copyright infringement are becoming an increasingly important legal vehicle to address competing
interests between copyright holders and users, as exacerbated by constantly evolving technologies. In CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH],3
the Supreme Court characterized exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights
as users’ rights, and not mere loop holes in Canada’s Copyright Act [CCA].4 In
2012, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the status of exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights in three judgments that allowed the court to further clarify
their nature and scope.5 In the same year, the CCA was amended significantly, in-

2

3
4
5

Modernization Act Backgrounder,” online: <http://balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crpprda.nsf/eng/h_rp01237.html>.
Copyright has expanded in subject matter, duration and scope through legislative
amendments in Canada and other jurisdictions worldwide, as well as in international
conventions. For a brief summary of the successive amendments to Canada’s Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and in relation to international conventions, see: Government of Canada, Canadian Heritage, “History of Copyright in Canada”, online:
<http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/eng/1274383301385/1274443077996>. In the
U.S., the progressive expansion of copyright has been widely commented upon. For
example, see Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books 2001).
At the international level, since its adoption in 1886, the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, September 9, 1886
[Berne Convention] has gone through many revisions to augment the protection of the
exclusive rights of copyright holders: revisions were made in 1908 (in Berlin) in 1928
(Rome), in 1948 (Brussels), in 1967 (Stockholm) and in 1971 (Paris). Other amendments were made in 1979: World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention
for
the
Protection
of
Literary
and
Artistic
Works,
online:
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html>. Any subsequent international agreements adopted under the Berne Convention, such as the WIPO Internet
Treaties of 1996 (i.e., the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, WO033EN,
online: <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P8_189> [WCT];
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, WO034EN, online:
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html> [WPPT]) must secure
greater protection for copyright holders: Berne Convention, art. 20. The Agreement on
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [TRIPS] Part II, 1, Part III, creates minimum standard obligations
for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, including copyright.
2004 SCC 13.
Supra note 2.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012
SCC 36 [Bell Canada]; Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 [Alberta], and Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory
Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68
[CRTC].
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cluding through the addition of new exceptions to copyright infringement or users’
rights.6
In this article, I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement
as they are laid out in the CCA and in copyright jurisprudence, as well as through
the interaction between these exceptions or users’ rights, contracts, and technological protection measures [TPMs]. What is the significance of the Supreme Court of
Canada characterization of exceptions as users’ rights? Are they mandatory? Does
the Supreme Court jurisprudence elevate the enumerated exceptions to copyright
infringement in the CCA to a higher level of protection than the unnamed permitted
acts of copyright users, i.e., those acts that have traditionally fallen outside the
scope of the exclusive rights of copyright holders?7 How can Canada be informed
by and inform other jurisdictions on the nature of exceptions to copyright
infringement?
While copyright users’ rights have triggered interest and debate amongst
scholars,8 relatively little attention has been given to defining their precise nature

6

7

8

CMA, supra note 1. Most provisions of the CMA came into force on November 7 2012:
SI/2012-85 November 7, 2012. See the discussion on the exceptions to copyright infringement introduced by the CMA in Part 2.
The traditional permitted acts include the unlimited right to play, view, read, perform in
a private setting, listen to the work, and transfer the owned copy of the copyright work
to another person: see the discussion in Part 2 of this article.
For example see: L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A
Law of Users Rights (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1991); Julie E.
Cohen, “The place of the User in Copyright Law” (2005) 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347;
Joseph P. Liu, “Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer” (2003) 44 B.C.L. Rev. 397;
Niva Elkin-Koren, “Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA” (2007) 22
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1119; Deborah Tussey, “From Fan Sites to File Sharing: Personal
Use in Cyberspace” (2001) 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129; Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Healing
Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair
Dealing and US Fair Use” (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 309; Myra J. Tawfik, “International
Copyright Law and Fair Dealing as a User Right” (2005) UNESCO Copyright Bulletin,
online:
<http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=27422&URL_DO
=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>; Abraham Drassinower “Taking User
Rights Seriously”, in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 462; Daniel Gervais, “Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH” (2004) 18 I.P.J. 131; Myra J. Tawfik, “International Copyright
Law: W[h]iter User Rights?”, in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future
of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 66; Theresa Scassa, “Users’
Rights in the Balance: Recent Developments in Copyright law at the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2005) 22 C.I.P.J. 133; Carys J. Craig, “The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in
Canadian Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform”, in Michael Geist, ed.,
In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2005); Abraham Drassinower, “Exceptions properly so-called” in Ysolde Gendreau &
Abraham Drassinower, Langues et droit d’auteur/Language and Copyright (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2009) 217; Ariel Katz, “Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair
Dealing in Canada” in Michael Geist, ed., The Copyright Pentalogy, How the Supreme
Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) 93; Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, “Accommodating
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and reflecting on the consequences of their interaction with contracts and TPMs.9
By this exercise, I seek to enlighten the debate on the place of users in copyright
law, with a particular attention to the rights and interests of individual consumers,
by emphasizing the growing importance of exceptions to copyright infringement as
a vehicle to promote their interests, while providing a cautionary tale through significant shortcomings to achieve this goal.
In Part 2, I analyze four exceptions to copyright infringement that were added
to the CCA in 2012, with a particular focus on their relevance for consumers and
their relation to pre-existing users’ rights, as well as to the traditional powers and
privileges attributed to the ownership of copies of copyright works. In Part 3, I
analyze the interplay between the users’ rights set out in the CCA and how they
may be altered or overridden by non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and
TPMs. To this end, I refer to selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements
for the online distribution of books, musical recordings, and films.10 In Part 4, I
investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement: are they rights or
privileges? Are they mandatory? I conclude in Part 5 by reflecting on the damaging
effects of the uncertain nature of users’ rights to the coherence and, ultimately, the
legitimacy of copyright law and policy.

2. ACTS COPYRIGHT USERS MAY PERFORM WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
Copyright consumers and other users may not perform acts that are exclusively reserved to copyright holders11 unless they obtain their authorization or unless the CCA explicitly permits copyright users to perform those acts. In Canada,
copyright means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work in any material
form, to perform the work in public, to publish the work, and other exclusive rights
with respect to performers’ performance, sound recordings and communication signals.12 Copyright also includes a non-exhaustive list of specific acts such as the
exclusive right to communicate a dramatic or musical work to the public, or to rent
a computer program or a sound recording embedding a musical work.13

9
10
11
12
13

the interests of the copyright consumer: New institutional dynamics in the wake of the
infosoc directive” in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, et al., eds., Särtryck ur Festskrift till Marianne Levin (Norstedts Juridik: 2008); Jens Schovsbo, “Integrating Consumer Rights into Copyright law: From the European Perspective” (2008) 31 J. Cons.
Policy 393; Peter Rott, “Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the
Role of (Consumer) Contract Law” (2008) 31 J. Consum. Policy 441; European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policies Department: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, “The Relations Between Copyright Law And Consumers’ Rights From
A European Perspective” by Séverine Dusollier (2010).
The effects of the introduction of TPMs on the copyright framework continue to trigger
interest and debate: see the discussion on TPMs in Part 3.(b), below.
See my review of selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part 3.(c),
below.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 3, 15, 18, 21, 26.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 2, 3, 15, 16, 18, 21, 26.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 3.

6

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[26 I.P.J.]

Outside the acts exclusively reserved to copyright holders, ownership in copies of copyright works has been traditionally viewed as conferring unlimited powers and privileges to use the copy in any other manner, including the unlimited right
to play, view, read, perform in a private setting and listen to the work, as well as to
transfer ownership in the copies.14 Through the combination of various factors, the
traditional unlimited privileges and powers to play, view, read, listen to, and transfer commercial copies of copyright works are under increased pressure, especially
with respect to commercial copies distributed online with no physical supporting
medium.15
In addition to the unlimited powers and privileges to use the copy in any manner that is not specifically reserved to copyright holders, the CCA enumerates exceptions to copyright infringement that allow certain copyright users to perform
specific acts for specific purposes in specific circumstances.16 In this part, I investigate the scope of four exceptions to copyright infringement particularly relevant to
copyright consumers that were added to the CCA in 2012, i.e., the non-commercial
user-generated content, the reproduction for private purposes, the later listening or
viewing and the backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement.17 In addition
to these exceptions, the following exceptions or limitations to copyright holders’
exclusive rights are also relevant to an analysis of copyright consumers’ rights to
commercial copies of copyright works: the non-substantial part doctrine,18 the pri-

14

15

16

17
18

Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Théberge] at para.
31, Binnie J. for the majority: “Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member
of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it.” See also Joseph P. Liu, “Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the
Incidents of Copy Ownership” (2001) 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245 at 1287.
Those factors include the scope of the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction and
the distribution of a work (as well as its exhaustion) and the effect of TPMs and of nonnegotiated standard end-user agreements for commercial copies of copyright works.
See the discussion in Parts 3.(b) and 3.(c) of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29–32.3, enumerates exceptions to copyright infringement that
includes fair dealing, exceptions applying to educational institutions, library, archives
and museums, computer programs, and ephemeral recordings.
CMA, supra note 1.
Since the enactment of Canada’s first copyright act, the Copyright Act, 1921, S.C.
1921, c. 24, s. 3(1), copyright has been delineated by the exclusive right to produce or
reproduce, perform in public or publish (if the work is unpublished) the whole or a
substantial part of the copyright work (CCA, supra note 2, s. 3(1)). As a result, consumers may make any reproduction, performance in public, or publication of a nonsubstantial part of copyright works without the authorization of the copyright holders.
Acts performed on non-substantial parts of copyright works are outside the realm of
copyright holders’ exclusive rights and can be performed without compensation to copyright holders and without infringing copyright: See David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) [Vaver, Copyright Law 2000] at 143ff.; McKeown, Fox
on Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson,
Carswell: 2003) ch. 21 at 14ff.
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vate copying regime,19 the fair dealing provisions,20 the computer programs and
technological process exceptions,21 and the exhaustion of the exclusive right to distribute copies of copyright works embedded in a physical object, or the first sale
19

20

21

The private copying regime is an exception to copyright infringement that allows consumers to reproduce for the private use of the person who makes the copy, sound recordings and certain copyright works embodied in sound recordings (more precisely: a
musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical
work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical work, or a
performer’s performance of a musical work is embodied: CCA, supra note 2, s. 80(1)),
onto an “audio recording medium” as it is defined in CCA, ibid., s. 79. The approved
tariff for private copying for the year 2011: Private Copying Tariff, 2011 (Copyright
Board of Canada, December 18, 2010), online: <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffstarifs/certified-homologues/copying-copie-e.html>, s. 2, defines “blank audio recording
medium” as “(a) a recording medium, regardless of its material form, onto which a
sound recording may be reproduced, that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual
consumers for that purpose and on which no sounds have ever been fixed, including
recordable compact discs (CD-R, CD-RW, CD-R Audio, CD-RW Audio); and (b) any
medium prescribed by regulations pursuant to sections 79 and 87 of the Act; (support
audio vierge).” This permitted use applies to one portion of copyright works purchased
by consumers, i.e., sound recordings of musical works (including performers’ performance of musical works) and does not apply to other works protected by copyright.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29–29.2. Fair dealing is an exception to copyright infringement
under which users can perform acts with copyright works without the authorization of
copyright holders for the enumerated purposes of research, private study, criticism, review, news reporting, and the recently introduced purposes of education, parody, or
satire, provided that the dealing is fair. In CCH, supra note 3 at paras. 53ff., the Supreme Court in a unanimous judgment by Chief Justice McLachlin, enumerated a nonexhaustive list of six factors that should guide courts and adjudicators on the factual
assessment of whether the dealing with a copyright work was fair. The six factors are:
(1) the purpose of the dealing, i.e., making “an objective assessment of the
user/defendant’s real purpose or motive in using the copyrighted work;” (ibid. at para.
54) (2) the character of the dealing, i.e., how the work is dealt with (e.g., widespread
distribution versus limited copies for private use (ibid. at para. 55); (3) the amount of
the dealing, i.e., both the amount of the work taken and the importance of the work
(ibid. at para. 56); (4) alternatives to the dealing, e.g., the existence of a non-copyright
work and whether the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose (ibid. at para. 57); (5) the nature of the work, e.g., whether the work was published or whether it was confidential (ibid. at para. 58); and (6) the effect of the dealing
on the work, i.e., “if the reproduced work is likely to compete with the market of the
original work,” an important but not the most important factor to consider (ibid. at
para. 59).
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 30.6, 30.61, 30.71. The permitted acts revolve around technical
issues that are specific to computer programs and to uses that are deemed essential to
their proper enjoyment: conversion from one computer language to another and adaptation of the computer program to address interoperability issues, so long as such acts are
performed for the consumer or user’s own purposes. The CMA, supra note 1, introduced another exception to copyright infringement (i.e., CCA, supra note 2, s. 30.71)
which allows copyright users to reproduce any works, only to the extent that the reproduction is temporary and essential to a “technological process” and that it facilitates a
use that does not infringe copyright.
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doctrine.22 I have discussed elsewhere the nature and scope of these additional exceptions to copyright infringement, as well as their merit and shortcomings with
respect to consumers’ uses of commercial copies of copyright works.23 I will refer
to these additional exceptions as they relate to the four exceptions to copyright
infringement that I discuss here, and in my analysis on the nature and scope of
users’ rights in the CCA further below.24
The four new exceptions to copyright infringement that I examine in this article allow individual users25 to perform certain acts for defined purposes without
copyright holders’ authorization.26 The four new exceptions allow acts to be performed on substantial parts of copyright works.27 They co-exist with the fair dealing provisions and may be invoked with these provisions, to the extent that they are
applicable.28 The scope of the four new exceptions to copyright infringement permits acts that fall within and beyond the allowable purposes of fair dealing.29 Each
of the permitted acts thereunder may fulfill the requirement of fairness under the
second step of the fair dealing analysis, although it does not need to be established.
The acts need to fall within specific purposes and uses and fulfill other conditions.30 The exception to copyright infringement that pertains to reproduction for

22

23

24
25

26
27
28
29

30

In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 2012
by the CMA, supra note 1, which amended the CCA, supra note 2, ss. 3, 15 and 18. In
the U.S., see 17 U.S.C. §109 (a).The doctrine is known as the first sale doctrine in the
U.S. and as the principle of exhaustion in other jurisdictions. This is the rule by which
once the first sale of physical objects embodying copyright works (such as a book,
DVD, or a music CD) has occurred with the authorization of the copyright holder, they
cannot dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object. The exhaustion or first
sale doctrine can be invoked only by lawful owners of copies of copyright works and
not by licensees, borrowers or people who otherwise access copies of copyright works.
It restricts copyright holders’ exclusive distribution right and does not apply to other
exclusive rights, e.g., the right to reproduce the work or to communicate the work to
the public by telecommunication.
Pascale Chapdelaine, The Copyright Consumers’ Bargain, Defining the Rights to Commercial Copies of Copyright Works (Doctor of Philosopy Thesis, York University
Graduate Program in Law, 2013) [unpublished] at 53–75, 83–90.
See the discussion in Part 4, below.
Three of the four new user provisions apply to “individuals”: CCA, supra note 2, ss.
29.21–29.23, while one applies to persons, which includes natural and physical persons: ibid., s. 29.24.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.21–29.24.
I.e., users who perform acts on non-substantial parts do not infringe copyright and do
not need to invoke an exception to copyright infringement: see supra note 18.
CCH, supra note 3 at para. 49.
For example, the acts authorized under the non-commercial user-generated content:
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21, may or may not fall under the purpose of parody or satire
under the fair dealing provisions (ibid., s. 29). The reproduction for private purposes
(ibid., s. 29.22) or the later viewing or listening exception (ibid., s. 29.23) may or may
not fall under the purpose of research or private study in the fair dealing provision
(ibid., s. 29).
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.21–29.24.
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private purposes31 is subject to the application of the private copying regime.32 The
four new exceptions to copyright infringement do not require remunerating copyright holders, similarly to acts performed on a non-substantial part of the work or
acts that are fair dealing, and unlike the private copying regime.33
Most consumers would be surprised to find out that prior to the entry into
force of the amendments to the CCA in 2012, adding the four new exceptions to
copyright infringement, they were either not allowed to or it was unclear whether
they could upload on YouTube their own performance incorporating a latest hit,
they could copy their favourite musical recordings on their iPods, or record broadcasts for later viewing.34 These mundane acts have formed part of the everyday life
of most copyright consumers for some time now. With multiple technological tools
that enhance the overall experience and convenience of the use of copyright works,
lawful consumers may reasonably expect that they are allowed to apply these capabilities through the acts they perform on copies of copyright works.
By adding the four new exceptions to copyright infringement, Parliament took
steps toward a formal recognition of the place and interests of individual copyright
users more than it had ever done before. The amendments to the CCA in 2012
introduced three new permitted uses without the authorization of copyright holders
that only apply to individuals,35 and a fourth that applies to a person.36 While the
majority of limitations on copyright holders’ exclusive rights or users’ rights either
apply to all categories of users, as in the case of fair dealing,37 or specifically apply
to institutional users,38 the CCA singles out more than ever before39 a group of
individuals that are to be likened to consumers as defined in consumer protection
laws.40 The commercial versus non-commercial dichotomy, a defining factor by

31
32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

Ibid., s. 29.22.
Ibid., s. 29.22(3).
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 3, 29–29.2, 79–87.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.21–29.24.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21: “Non-commercial user-generated content,” s. 29.22: “Reproduction for private purposes,” s. 29.23: “Fixing signals and recording programs for
later listening or viewing.”
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.24: “Backup copies.”
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29–29.2.
Or person acting under their authority, such as “educational institutions”: CCA, supra
note 2, ss. 29.4ff. or “libraries, archives and museums,” s. 30.1ff.
Prior to the entry into force of the CMA, supra note 1, there was one reference to
“consumers” under the private copying regime provisions: CCA, supra note 2, ss. 79ff.
I.e., Canadian provincial and territorial consumer protection laws share similar definitions of consumers. See, for example: Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. C-30,
Sched. A, s. 1, [OCPA]: “consumer” means an individual acting for personal, family,
or household purposes and does not include a person who is acting for business purposes; Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, [QCPA] s. 1(e): “consumer” means
a natural person, except a merchant who obtains goods or services for the purposes of
his business.” This definition covers purchases that are primarily or accessorily related
the merchant’s business: Nicole L’Heureux, Droit de la consommation, 5ieme édition
(Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 34. See also U.S. UCC §2-103 c) (2004); the
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which to determine the identity of consumers in consumer protection law, is present
only to a limited extent in the four new user provisions and the CCA.41 The extent
to which the four new user provisions are aptly called users’ rights is another matter which I explore below in this article42 and so is the extent to which they fulfill
copyright consumers’ needs and expectations within the objectives of copyright
law. With these general considerations in mind, I will briefly introduce the distinguishing features of each of the four new exceptions to copyright infringement.

41

42

various European directives regulating consumer transactions define “consumer” as
“any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes
which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession,” with some minor variances:
EC, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] OJ L 95/04 at 29 [Directive 93/13/EEC], art. 2(b); EC, Parliament and
Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of
distance contracts, [1997] O.J. L144/19, art. 2(2) (which will be repealed by EU, Directive 2011/83/EU, as of June 13, 2014); EC, Parliament and Council Directive
1999/44/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees, [1999] O J L 171, art 1, 2. (a); EC, Council and Parliament
Directive 2011/83/EU of 22 November 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council
Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, [2011] OJ L 304/64 [Directive 2011/83/EU],
art. 2 (1) which applies to contracts concluded after June 13, 2014 (art. 28 (2)). In the
U.K., see the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.), c. 50, s. 12, definition of “dealing as a consumer.”
Until recently, the commercial versus non-commercial purpose distinction was present
only to a limited extent in the CCA, supra note 2. For example certain exceptions to
copyright infringement only apply to actions that are carried out “without motive of
gain”: s. 29.3. Among the four new exceptions to copyright infringement introduced in
the CCA in 2012 and studied here, the requirement of non-commercial purposes is present in the “non-commercial user-generated content” exception to copyright infringement: s. 29.21. The 2012 amendments also introduced permitted acts on copyright
works for “private purposes,” which is a sphere that does not involve performances in
or communications to the public: s. 29.22 “Reproduction for Private Purposes” and s.
29.23 “Fixing Signals and Recording Programs for Later Listening or Viewing” limit
the acts that can be performed on copyright works without authorization to reproduction and fixing communication signals and do not involve communication to the public
or performance in public. The fact that permitted acts for “private purposes” apply to
individuals only and not persons, as is the case under other permitted acts (e.g., s. 29.24
“backup copies” and s. 30.6, the permitted acts with respect to computer programs),
may also suggest that it precludes that the act be performed within commercial or other
non-personal capacity settings. The commercial versus non-commercial dichotomy is
also relevant to determine the scope of remedies and damages that are available to
copyright holders: ss. 32.2(1), 38.1(1)(b), 38.1(1.12), 38.1(1.2), s. 38.1(5)(d).
See the discussion below in Part 4 of this article.
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(a) Non-commercial User-generated Content
The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement (familiarly referred to as the “YouTube exception”)43 allows individuals to
perform on any form of published copyright works,44 for the creation of new copyright works, all acts (but for one) otherwise reserved to copyright holders (i.e., the
exclusive right to produce, reproduce, and to perform substantial parts of the works
in public).45 The individuals are still subject to the moral rights of the author of the
underlying work.46 The individuals have rights with respect to the newly created
works that are limited to: authorizing other household members to use the works
and authorizing an intermediary to disseminate the newly created works,47 for noncommercial purposes, with proper reference to the pre-existing work. Such use or
dissemination must not “have a substantial adverse effect, . . . on the exploitation
. . . of the existing [copyright] work or on an existing or potential market for it,
including that the new [copyright] work is not a substitute for the existing one.”48
The individual must also have reasonable grounds to believe that the pre-existing
copyright work or copy of it was not infringing copyright.49
The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement is the broadest of the four new user provisions in two respects: the wide range
of permitted acts that may be performed with respect to pre-existing copyright
works and the fact that it is not specifically subjected to the non-circumvention of
TPMs.50 It confers a special standing to the creation of new copyright works that
takes place through the use of pre-existing works (often referred to as transforma-

43

44
45

46
47
48
49
50

See: Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act —
Backgrounder, What will the Bill do — Users and Consumers, available at
<http://balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h_rp01237.html>. For a discussion on the non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement see: Theresa Scassa, “Acknowledging Copyright’s Illegitimate Offspring: UserGenerated Content and Canadian Copyright Law” in Michael Geist, ed., The Copyright
Pentalogy, How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian
Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) 431.
Or otherwise made available to the public: CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21(1).
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 3, 15, 18, 21 26. It does not permit individuals to publish unpublished works: s. 29.21. Also, for the exception to copyright infringement to apply, the
new creation must meet the requirement of originality for works to be protected: s. 5.
For the test of originality in Canadian copyright law, see: CCH, supra note 3 at paras.
14ff. See also David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law Copyright, Patents, TradeMarks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011] at
100ff.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21 creates an exception to the infringement of copyright
which is separate from moral rights: CCA, ibid., s. 14.1.
Or authorize members of their household to do so: CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21(1).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21(1)(d).
Ibid., s. 29.21(1)(c).
Ibid., s. 29.21.
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tive acts or uses).51 The premise is that if the objective of copyright is to promote
the creation of works, the use of a pre-existing work to create a new work should be
desirable and should be promoted to balance the interests of the pre-existing copyright holder with the ones of the would-be copyright holder. Among the broader
group of consumers and users, it favours individuals who generate new creations. I
have questioned elsewhere the greater emphasis that is placed on creative consumers, the extent to which this differential treatment is justified within copyright’s
design and objectives, and the potential detrimental effects that this has on less
laborious users.52 The sharp contrast between the non-commercial user-generated
provision and the other new user provisions introduced in the CCA that I look at
next illustrate that gap.

(b) Reproduction for Private Purposes
The reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement
(also referred to as the “MP3 exception”)53 allows individuals to perform one of the
acts (i.e., reproduction) otherwise reserved to copyright holders on any form of
copyright works, subject to a list of strict conditions.54 This user provision applies
to a broad range of methods of reproductions,55 subject to the application of the
private copying regime that continues to apply to sound recordings and certain copyright works embodied in sound recordings56 and that falls under its purview.57
This user provision does not set any limits on the number of reproductions that
may be made,58 but does require that they be made for private purposes.59 Because
the permitted act is limited to reproduction, this exception to copyright infringement would not permit the user to e.g., communicate copies of the work to the

51

52
53
54
55

56

57
58
59

Under U.S. copyright law, whether a transformation occurred, i.e., the creation of a
new work when using a pre-existing copyright work, is a favourable element for a
finding of fair use in applying the first factor of the fair use provision, i.e., the purpose
and character of the use (17 USC §107): Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (U.S. Supreme Court).
Chapdelaine, supra note 23 at 45–49.
See: Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act —
Backgrounder, supra note 43.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.22.
Ibid., at s. 29.22(2) which defines medium or device as including “digital memory in
which a work or subject-matter may be stored for the purpose of allowing the telecommunication of the work or other subject matter through the Internet or other digital
network.”
More precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a
musical work, or a performer’s performance of a musical work is embodied CCA,
supra note 2, s. 80(1).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.22(3), i.e., if the reproduction is made onto an audio recording
medium as defined in s. 79.
Ibid., s. 29.22(4) reference to the destruction of any reproductions made from the copy
confirms that multiple reproductions are permitted.
Ibid., s. 29.22(1)(e).
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public by telecommunication through the Internet.60 The private purpose required
for the exception to apply could also be an obstacle although the scope of use that it
allows has yet to be defined. The reproduction(s) need(s) to be made from a noninfringing copy that the individual lawfully acquired (other than through loan or
rental) on a medium or device that the individual is authorized to use.61 Other conditions apply to the handling of the reproduction(s) and the copy from which the
reproduction was made.62 Last but not least, this user provision is subject to the
individual not circumventing any access control or copy control TPM in place.63
By its dual requirement of ownership of the copy from which reproductions
are made and that reproductions are confined to private purposes, the reproduction
for private purposes exception applies more specifically to copyright consumers
than any of the other user provisions, although its application could extend beyond
that group.64 It also supplements the private copying regime that only applies to
sound recordings and certain copyright works embedded in sound recordings, and
does not cover reproduction on devices such as MP3 players.65 The fact that it is
explicitly subject to TPMs may significantly reduce its scope of application in practice and raises questions about the exact nature of that exception.66

(c) Later Listening or Viewing Exception
This user provision allows individuals to fix a communication signal or to
reproduce a work or sound recording or fix or reproduce a performer’s performance
that is being broadcast, and to record a program for later listening or viewing.67
This exception is subject to a list of strict conditions similar to the ones found in the
reproduction for private purposes exception examined earlier.68 This exception to

60
61
62

63

64

65

66
67
68

CCA, supra note 2, s. 2.4(1.1).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.22.
The individual cannot give the reproduction away: ibid., s. 29.22(1)(d). If the individual sells, rents, or gives away the copy from which the reproduction was made, she
needs to destroy any reproduction made from that copy: s. 29.22(4).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.22(1)(c). CCA, ibid., s. 41 defines “circumvent” as performing
acts either with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any
reserved acts.
By contrast, lawful acquisition of the copy is not required for the non-commercial usergenerated content exception and the purpose is broadened to include non-commercial
purposes. The later listening or viewing exception would also typically apply to consumers in their use of a service (i.e., broadcasting), but could apply to a broader circle
as well, beyond consumers as understood in consumer law, depending on the scope of
“private purposes.”
Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance, 2004 FCA
424 where the Federal Court of Appeal held that a permanently embedded or nonremovable memory, incorporated into a digital audio recorder (MP3 player) was not an
“audio recording medium” and therefore did not fall under the private copying exemption of the CCA. This considerably limits the scope of the allowable private copying.
See the discussion in Parts 3.(b) and 4 of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.23.
See Part 2.(b) of this article.
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copyright infringement applies only if the individual received the program legally69
and does not include work, performer’s performance, or sound recordings received
through an on-demand service.70 The individual may only make one recording,
may not give the recording away, and may not keep it longer than is reasonably
necessary to view it at a convenient time.71 The individual may only use the recording for her private purposes.72 Lastly, this user provision is subject to the individual
not circumventing any access control or copy control TPM in place.73
The acts authorized by this user provision have been allowed for some time in
the U.S. further to the landmark Supreme Court judgment Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,74 where the court held that manufacturers’ sale of home video
equipment was not contributory infringement of the copyrights in television programs.75 The U.S. Supreme Court arrived at that conclusion, inter alia, on the basis
that recording a televised copyrighted audiovisual work for time-shifting purposes
and for private home use was a fair use76 of the work and did not infringe copyright.77 In Canada, recording programs for later viewing did not always fall under
the allowable purposes of fair dealing,78 which explains in part the introduction of
this new exception to copyright infringement.
The later listening or viewing exception to copyright infringement legitimizes
mundane acts on programs that have been performed in many households for decades. It fills a lacuna in the CCA where Canada was lagging behind compared to
other jurisdictions. Unlike the reproduction for private purposes exception, it does
not target as specifically copyright consumers and their permitted uses of copies of
copyright works lawfully acquired.79 It covers a broad range of users who have, at
one point in time, the ability to record programs protected by copyrights and do so
for private purposes. The fact that it is subject to TPMs raises questions around the
exact nature and scope of this exception to copyright infringement.80

(d) Backup Copies
The fourth user provision allows persons (which would include natural and
moral persons) to make one of the acts otherwise reserved to copyright holders

69
70

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.23(1)(a).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.23(3) defines “on-demand service” as “a service that allows a
person to receive works, performer’s performances and sound recordings at times of
their choosing.”
Ibid., s. 29.23(1)(c), (d), (e).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.23(1)(f).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.23(1)(b); s. 41, defines “circumvent” as performing acts either
with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts.
464 U.S. 417 , 454-55 (1984) (U.S. Supreme Court).
Ibid.
17 USC §107.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra note 74 at 455.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29–29.2.
See the discussion in Part 2.(b) of this article.
See the discussion in Parts 3.(b) and 4 of this article.
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(i.e., reproduction) with any form of copyright work for backup purposes, so long
as the following conditions are respected: the person owns or has a licence to use a
copy of the copyright work that is being reproduced; it is not an infringing copy;
and the person does not give any of the reproductions away.81 The application of
the backup copy exception to copyright infringement is also subject to not circumventing any existing access control or copy control TPMs.82 With its recent introduction to the CCA, the backup copies provision extends to all copyright works a
similar exception to copyright infringement that already applied to computer
programs.83
The four new user provisions recognize the interests of copyright users in an
unprecedented way and validate acts that were previously an infringement of copyright, or the status of which was unclear. A more sobering account of these amendments is that they have been keeping us waiting. The acts that are now permitted
are so much part of the everyday life of an increasingly large segment of consumers, with no apparent harm to copyright holders, that Parliament had little choice
but to recognize their lawfulness to maintain the credibility of copyright. Does the
predominantly narrow scope and piecemeal approach of the four new user provisions, combined with pre-existing exceptions to copyright infringement address
lawful consumers’ reasonable expectations and does it reflect the main objectives
of copyright? Or, does it instead reflect a copyright-holder-centric approach that is
mainly preoccupied with preserving the strength of the copyright holders’ exclusive
rights with little compromise? The co-existence of some of the four new user provisions with TPMs and the uncertainty of their mandatory nature bring an important
perspective to these questions as I discuss further below.84
Understanding the magnitude of copyright holders’ ability to shape the user
rights discussed so far in this article through contract is critical for a clearer view of
the acts that consumers may actually perform on copyright works and the dilemmas
they face. Copyright holders’ contracts with end-users also raise broader policy design questions on the effects of copyright holders’ commercial practices, including
the use of TPMs, on the primary objectives of copyright law. This is what I turn to
next.

3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT, CONTRACTS
AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES (TPMS)
(a) Copyright Public Policy Meets Copyright Holders’ Private Rights
The interaction between copyright, contracts, and TPMs raises among the
most pressing issues in contemporary copyright law. The interaction puts in question the desirable scope of the private rights created by copyright law and the public policy goals that it promotes, as well as the proper level of flexibility that needs
to be granted for the commercial exploitation of copyright. The CCA sets the de-

81
82
83
84

CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.24.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.24(1)(c); s. 41 defines “circumvent” as performing acts either
with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 30.6(b).
See the discussion in Parts 3.(b) and 4 of this article.

16

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[26 I.P.J.]

fault rules of copyright holders’ exclusive rights in their works that are opposable
to all.85 This includes the exclusive right of copyright holders to authorize any of
the acts specifically reserved to them by the CCA.86 Copyright holders control the
exploitation of their exclusive rights and commercialization of their works by
granting authorizations including through contracts. In the absence of explicit contract terms, the default rules of the CCA will apply and some terms may be implied
between the parties based on the relevant circumstances.87 In consumer transactions, copyright holders resort increasingly to non-negotiated standard end-user
agreements.88 Copyright holders can also control the commercialization of their
works by applying TPMs that, in their effect, are comparable to contract terms,
while raising distinct issues and debates within and outside copyright law.89
As much as the CCA confers exclusive rights on copyright holders, it is by its
own design and purpose an incomplete code: more often than not, copyright holders resort to contracts as a vehicle to tailor their copyright to the particular needs of
the transaction.90 This occurs at two levels. First, authors conclude contracts for the

85
86
87

88

89

90

CCA, supra note 2, s. 27ff.
Ibid., ss. 3, 15, 18, 21, 26.
With respect to implied licences see: Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra
note 45 at 137–141; Robert Bradgate, “Consumer rights in digital products” 2010, online: <http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4ADBF_
enCA275CA275&q=Bradgate%2c+Consumer+rights+in+digital+products+2010> at
37.
I discuss the nature and content of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements
through which copies of copyright works are commercialized in Part 3.(c) of this
article.
TPMs are comparable to contracts in effect because the physical restrictions they impose on copyright works can be analogized to a contractual restriction on use of the
copyright work. Trotter Hardy, “Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital
World” (1995) 1 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2 at 2–11 describes TPMs alongside contracts as
two of the four means by which copyright holders can control unauthorized acts being
performed on their works (the other two being copyright law and the obstacle based on
the state of the copying art (e.g., the (in)ability to make perfect copies as a practical
limitation (present or absent) that confers greater power for copyright holders’ to control the unauthorized use of their works (or not)). TPMs are also regulated by specific
provisions of the CCA, supra note 2 that were introduced in 2012: see the discussion on
the nature and effects of TPMs in Part 3.(b) of this article.
See CCA, supra note 2, s. 13(4); Théberge, supra note 14 at para. 12; As the Supreme
Court of Canada noted in Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 at para. 58: “parties are, have been, and will continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright Act.” In Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC
37 at para. 117, per Abella J. (to which Chief Justice MacLachlin concurred, as well as
Bastarache, Lebel and Charron JJ. on this particular issue): “Other cases illustrate that a
copyright holder’s ability to alienate its interest either through licensing or assignment
is perfectly consistent with the statutory scheme. Vertical and horizontal divisibility is,
arguably, a hallmark of copyright: see Bouchet v. Kyriacopoulos (1964), 45 C.PR. 265
(Can. Ex. CT).” In a U.S. context, see David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand” in David Nimmer, Copyright,
Sacred Text, Technology and the DMCA (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law Inter-
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exploitation of their economic intangible rights with publishers, music producers,
film-makers, etc. They may assign or license their copyright, in whole or in part,
including with respect to the list of their exclusive rights, territory, or the duration
of their copyright. The CCA explicitly contemplates this panoply of scenarios.91
These agreements address the exploitation of the intangible exclusive rights of authors/copyright holders. Second, authors, but most frequently copyright holders,
conclude contracts for the commercialization of copies of the copyright works that
generally dictate what users are allowed to do with the copies. These contracts are
commonly referred to as “shrink wrap,” “browse wrap,” “click wrap,” or end-user
licence agreements.92 In a consumer context, they are typically non-negotiated
standard end-user agreements. This is the area where the incompleteness of the
copyright code is most apparent, leading to uncertainty about the effects and proper
treatment of the interaction between the CCA and the contracts for the commercialization of copies of copyright works. It concerns the exclusive distribution right
that was only added recently in Canada to copyright holders’ exclusive rights.93
In Canada, the CCA has been described by the Supreme Court in Théberge as
the balance between “promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the
creator.”94 How does (should) the law treat contracts for the commercialization of
copyright works that expand the exclusive rights and powers of copyright holders
or go against the objectives of the CCA or similar constitutive acts? How do we
make that assessment? To what extent is an expansion through contract the normal
exercise of freedom of contract and of privileges and powers of copyright holders
and to what extent is it outside their prerogative or needs to be constrained? Should
we make a distinction between non-negotiated and negotiated agreements, massmarket commercialization and isolated occurrences?
The proliferation of the commercialization of copies of copyright works
through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, combined with the use of
TPMs, has been widely commented upon by authors, including Margaret Jane Radin, Niva Elkin-Koren and Jacques De Werra, as occasioning the “privatization of

91
92

93

94

national, 2003) 267 at 274 (reproducing an article by the same title initially published
in (1999) 87 Cal. L. Rev. 17).
CCA, supra note 2, s. 13(4).
For a description of the various types of standard form agreements of digital products,
see: Marco B.M. Loos, et al., “Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital
content contracts” (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European
Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam Centre for
Law and Economics (ACLE), online: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumermarketing/events/digital_conf_en.htm at 65-66>; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2013) at 10–12. For a summary of the various scenarios
under which digital products are distributed see: Bradgate, supra note 87 at 32.
In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 2012
by the CMA, supra note 1, which amended the CCA, supra note 2, ss. 3, 15 and 18. See
also supra note 22.
Théberge, supra note 14 at para. 30.
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copyright” or as the techno-governance phenomenon.95 The fear is that through
non-negotiated standard end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders supersede the pre-existing copyright regime by expanding their privileges and powers.96
These concerns fit in the broader discussion of the perception by users that standard
form agreements exemplify the norm, by behavioural law and economics research
suggests.97 Superseding the copyright regime can occur through restrictive terms
that also apply to works that are in the public domain, or that make exceptions to
copyright holders’ exclusive rights no longer effective. For example, contract terms
or TPMs can limit users’ ability to make a fair dealing or fair use of a work that
allow users to, inter alia, exercise their freedom of expression through criticism,
review or parody.98 Its effects on the balance objectives of copyright law become
significant in a standardized environment where the commercial practice is
widespread.

95

96

97

98

See, for example, Niva Elkin-Koren, “A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting
over Copyrights”, in R. Cooper-Dreyfuss, et al., eds., Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) 191 at 195; Margaret Jane Radin, “Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the Firm” (20032004) U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 173; Jacques De Werra, “Moving Beyond The Conflict
Between Freedom Of Contract And Copyright Policies: In Search Of A New Global
Policy For On-Line Information Licensing Transactions” (2003) 25 Colum.-V.L.A. J.
L. & Arts 239. See also Marc A. Lemley, “Beyond Preemption: The Law And Policy
Of Intellectual Property Licensing” (1999) 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111; Charles R. McManis,
“The Privatization (“Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright Law” (1999) 87
C.A.L.R. 173; for an analysis of the complex interplay between copyright law, contract
and technology, see generally Daniel.Gervais, “The Price of Social Norms: Towards a
Liability Regime for File-Sharing” (2004) 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 39. This interaction is
addressed in the context of authors rights in: Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2010) in particular, chapters 6 to 9 (112–200); Nicola Lucchi, “The Supremacy of
Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content and Consumer Protection in the
Globalized Information Society” (2007) 15 Int’l J.L. & I.T. 192 at 194; Jens Schovsbo,
Integrating Consumer rights into Copyright law: From the European Perspective (2008)
31 J. Cons. Policy 393 at 398; Eduardo Moises Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010) at 46–51. Generally, on the
phenomenon of non-negotiated standard terms, see Radin, supra note 92.
Natali Helberger, et al., “Digital Rights Management and Consumer Acceptability: A
Multi-Disciplinary Discussion of Consumer Concerns and Expectations” (2004), online: <http://www.indicare.org/tiki-download_ file.php?fileId=111> at 117.
In particular, how default rules (and in the present case standard end-user agreements)
both respond to and construct social norms and have a normative effect: On Amir &
Orly Lobel, “Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and
Policy”, book review of Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, by R.H. Thaler & C.R. Sunstein and of D. Ariely, “Predictably irrational: the
hidden forces that shape our decisions” (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2098 at 2121-2122.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 95 at 197, where the author notes that the public interest or
public domain is an absent consideration in individualized market transactions and that
the promotion of these interests cannot be left to the will of market forces alone.
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The commercialization of copyright works through non-negotiated standard
end-user agreements is not a new phenomenon. It became prevalent with respect to
the commercialization of computer programs in the 60s at a time when their legal
protection through copyright was not yet certain.99 In that context, it was deemed
necessary to seek additional protection through contract.100 Until recently, books,
music and films were commercialized without exhaustive terms and conditions.
The landscape is changing with the commercialization of these works through online means of distribution,101 which can also include TPMs.102 Given the current
protection of books, music, and films under copyright law and the fact that they
have been traditionally commercialized without terms and conditions, one would
assume that contract clauses that dictated permitted uses of copies would be superfluous, unless copyright holders authorize consumers to perform more acts on their
work than the CCA allows.103 Conversely, it would be suspicious if they constrain
consumers to perform fewer acts on their works than the CCA allows.104
Commentators have looked at how various doctrines, within and outside copyright law, provide remedies to copyright users and consumers in the case of contracts (in particular, non-negotiated standard end-user agreements) that tend to expand copyright’s exclusive powers and privileges beyond the statute that creates
them.105 They include the application of the U.S. doctrine of preemption106 and,

99
100
101
102
103

104
105
106

See: Glen. O. Robinson, “Personal Property Servitudes,” 71 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1449
at 1473-1474.
Ibid.
I discuss the nature and scope of online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements
in Part 3.(c) of this article.
See the discussion in Part 3.(b) of this article.
This assumption of the scope of contractual terms of use vis-à-vis the default regime of
the CCA relies on the particular emphasis by the Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence on the CCA’s role to balance competing interests and on the place of exceptions
to copyright infringement as user rights: see Théberge, supra note 14; CCH, supra note
3; Bell Canada, supra note 5; Alberta, supra note 5; CRTC, supra note 5. For a discussion on how a more absolutist view of copyright holders’ exclusive rights supports
further control of copyright holders’ exclusive rights through contract, see Hardy,
supra note 89, in particular at 10-11, 36–44.
Ibid.
In particular, Elkin-Koren, supra note 95; Lucchi, supra note 95; de Werra, supra note
95.
I.e., the U.S.-based federal doctrine of statutory preemption: 17 USC, §301, supremacy
clause preemption or constitutional preemption: see de Werra, supra note 95 at
263–273, and the doctrine of contractual preemption: see U.S. Copyright Office, A Report of the Register of Copyrights pursuant to section 104 of the DMCA (2001) online:
<http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html> [DMCA 2001 Report] at 162–164; see also Hardy, supra note 89 at 22–35; David Nimmer, Elliot Brown
& Gary N. Frischling, “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand” (1999) 87 Cal. L.
Rev. 17 at 40–68; Elkin-Koren, supra note 95 at 215.
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more generally, of constitutional fundamental rights,107 of copyright misuse,108
public policy,109 unconscionability,110 competition and antitrust law,111 and the
doctrine of abus de droit in the civil law jurisdictions.112 While these doctrines
may provide a legal basis for copyright users’ claims in specific cases, they are
either too broad or too narrow to address the specific issues and effects of copyright
end-user agreements.113 They provide little guidance and support to copyright
users.114 The detailed analyses of the application of these legal doctrines to the
commercialization of copyright works underscore the distorting pressures that private ordering can exercise on the copyright framework. They illustrate the power
that the sphere of private ordering enables for copyright holders, with little countervailing force to integrate public interest considerations and with that, the ability of
lawful users to perform certain acts on copyright works.
The interaction between the copyright regime and contracts raises complex
issues because it questions the purpose and objectives of copyright, what its proper
scope should be, and how much flexibility is desirable in how copyright is exploited and commercialized. The CCA and similar copyright laws in other jurisdictions say little about this interaction if it is not to endorse an unrestricted freedom
of exploitation of copyright holders’ works. The fear is that through non-negotiated
standard end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders supersede the pre-existing copyright regime to their advantage to expand their privileges and powers to
the detriment of other competing interests that are addressed in the CCA and similar
statutes in other jurisdictions.115 The use of TPMs by copyright holders is a manifestation of the possible extension of copyright through private ordering. The legal
protection of TPMs recently introduced in the CCA raises specific issues that I explore next.116
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Lucie Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts, An analysis of the Contractual
Overridability of Limitations on Copyright (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2002) at 263–277.
Ibid., at 284–289; De Werra, supra note 95 at 273–279.
De Werra, supra note 95 at 279–282.
Ibid., at 282–286; Lucchi, supra note 95 at 221ff.
Guibault, supra note 107 at 242–251; De Werra, supra note 95 at 286–291.
Guibault, supra note 107 at 278–283; De Werra, supra note 95 at 338-339. On the
application of the doctrine of abus de droit to copyright, see also: Pierre-Emmanuel
Moyse, “Kraft Canada c. Euro-Excellence: l’insoutenable légèreté du droit” (2008) 53
R.D. McGill 741 at 784–791.
De Werra, supra note 95 at 263–294, 338-339, 345-346.
Ibid.
Marc A. Lemley, supra note 95; McManis, supra note 95; See, for example, ElkinKoren, supra note 95 at 195; Radin, supra note 95; De Werra, supra note 95. For an
analysis of the complex interplay between copyright law, contract and technology, see
generally Gervais, supra note 95. This interaction is addressed in the context of authors
rights in: D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, supra note 95, in particular, chs.
6 to 9 (112–200); Lucchi, supra note 95 at 194; Schovsbo, supra note 95 at 398;
Penalver & Katyal, supra note 95 at 46–51.
CMA, supra note 1 which amended the CCA, supra note 2 by adding ss. 41ff.
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(b) Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)
One of the greatest controversies in contemporary copyright law explores how
the implementation of provisions to protect technological measures as required by
the WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996117 disturbs (or not) the fragile balance that
needs to subsist between copyright holders’ exclusive rights and the rights of copyright users to copyright works.118 The WIPO Internet Treaties require member
states119 to provide “adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
the circumvention of effective technological measures” used by copyright holders
with respect to digital works.120 The WIPO Internet Treaties impose no counterbalancing obligation on member states to preserve users’ exercise of permitted acts on
copyright works without the permission of the copyright holders, such as through
fair use, fair dealing, and other long-established exceptions to copyright
infringement.121
The WIPO Internet Treaties’ obligations to protect technological measures fall
within the broader digital agenda initiated by the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] that seeks to address “the profound impact of the development
and convergence of information and communication technologies on the creation
and use of literary and artistic works.”122 More than 15 years after the adoption of
TPMs in the WIPO Internet Treaties, the earlier passions ignited by their introduc-
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WCT, supra note 2; WPPT, supra note 2. WCT and WPPT are commonly referred to as
the WIPO Internet Treaties.
For a Canadian perspective on the digital agenda of the WIPO Internet Treaties, and
particularly the TPM provisions, see Michael Geist, ed., From “Radical Extremism” to
“Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2010) in particular ch. 7: Carys Craig, “Locking out lawful users: Fair Dealing
and anti-circumvention in Bill C-32” and ch. 8: Michael Geist, “The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-Circumvention Requirements.”
WCT, supra note 2 and WPPT, supra note 2 had, respectively, 91 and 92 member states
as per the WIPO official website reporting of contracting parties:
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/> (last visited December 4, 2013). Canada was a signatory but was not yet listed as a ratifying party. Member states include the U.S., the
E.U. and Member States of the E.U., China, Japan, Australia, and The Russian
Federation.
WCT, supra note 2, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 2, art. 18.
On how this topic and how this void does not allow a balance to subsist between copyright holders and users, see David Vaver, “Copyright and the Internet: From Owner
Rights and User Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties?” (2007) Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 731 [Vaver, “From Owner Rights to User Rights”].
WCT, supra note 2, Preamble. For a discussion of the new international obligations
brought on in the WIPO Internet Treaties with the TPMs and digital rights management provisions, and of the drafting process leading up to their adoption, see Mihaly
Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, The 1996 WIPO Treaties, Their Interpretation and Implementation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Part III; Sam
Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, The
Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at
964ff.
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tion are still alive, as illustrated by Canada’s various attempts at copyright legislative reform that finally led to the entry into force of the CMA in 2012.123
The controversy around TPMs forms part of the broader debate on the proper
balance that needs to exist between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and
the public interest, including the rights of copyright users.124 It includes conflicting
views on the scope of the international obligations that the WIPO Internet Treaties
impose on member states.125 Proponents of strong TPMs argue that the additional
clout to control access to and use of digital copyright works is essential to counter
piracy and is the mere recognition of the principle that copyright holders have the
right to control access to their copyright works.126 For supporters of TPMs, the
proper balance lies in providing sufficient protection that will promote the future
creation of digital copyright works to be disseminated for the benefit of users and
the public. Critics argue that access controls were never part of the exclusive rights
of copyright holders.127 They raise concerns about the effect of the legal protection
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126
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In Canada, TPMs occupied the larger part of the debates throughout the recent copyright legislative reform that led to the entry into force in 2012 of the CMA, supra note
1: See IP Osgoode (<www.iposgoode.ca>) a Canadian Copyright Reform resource
Guide, online at <http://researchguides.library.yorku.ca/content.php?pid=197824
&sid=1657041> assembling references to commentaries that were made during the discussions on Bill C-32, a large portion of which concerned digital locks and TPMs.
Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in Bill
C-32” in Michael Geist, ed., From Radical Extremism to Balanced Copyright: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 177 [“Locking Out
Lawful Users”]; Michael Geist, “The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO
Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-Circumvention Requirements” in From
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital
Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 222; Mihaly Ficsor, “TPMs and Flexibility (“The
Ability of Bending without Breaking”) — Why Should the TPM Provisions of Bill C32 Protect Access Controls and Prohibit “Preparatory Acts,” online at
<http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/11/digital-locks-circumvention-and-the-copyright-reforms-proposed-by-bill-c-32/>.
For a summary of the policy and legal debate around TPMs from the perspective of
copyright holders and copyright users and the public interest, and about where the
proper balance should be struck, see Peter K. Yu, “Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention” (2006) 84 Denv. U.L. Rev. 13, in particular at 17–19. See also Radin,
supra note 92 at 46-51.
In the context of Canada recent copyright reform, see, for example, Geist, supra note
123 and Ficsor, supra note 123.
Jane C. Ginsburg, “Can Copyright become User-Friendly? Review: Jessica Litman,
Digital Copyright” (2001) 25 Colum. J. L. & Arts 71 at 75-76; Jane C. Ginsburg,
“From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in
U.S. Copyright Law” (2003) 50 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 113 at 123. The author
acknowledges troubling aspects of the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties in
the U.S. through the DMCA: Jane C. Ginsburg, “Copyright Legislation for the Digital
Millennium” (1999) 23 Colum. J. L. & Arts 137 at 152-153.
Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 45 at 199; Craig, “Locking Out
Lawful Users”, supra note 123 at 197; Séverine Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et protection
des oeuvres dans l’univers numérique, 2nd ed. (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) [Dusollier
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of technological measures on access to copies of copyright works (which may include materials that are in the public domain) and exceptions to copyright infringement, such as fair dealing or fair use.128 At the wider level of digital rights management,129 critics fear that TPMs, as protected by law, allow copyright holders to
control uses of copyright works (amount of reading, viewing, and listening) that
have traditionally been outside the scope of copyright holders’ exclusive rights.130
With the entry into force of the CMA in 2012,131 Canada opted for a higher
level of protection of TPMs, similar to the highly contentious regime adopted in the
U.S. with the entry into force of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act [DMCA]
more than a decade earlier.132 The CCA now includes a new infringement with
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130

131
132

2007] at 384-385, 394-395, argues that the right to control access to the work resides
with the owners of the physical embodiment of the work, not copyright holders.
David Nimmer, “A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act” (2000)
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 at 739-740, observes: “The lengthy analysis of how section
1201 works in practice leads to the conclusion that its entire edifice of user exemptions
is of doubtful puissance. The user safeguards so proudly heralded as securing balance
between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to achieve their stated
goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only users whose interests are
truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever technological measures are placed in their path.”; Craig, “Locking Out
Lawful Users,” supra note 123, in particular at 195.
Digital rights management is a broader concept than TPMs that encompasses tracking
uses made by copyright holders and identification codes and copyright holders’ signatures of copies of copyright works. In addition to obligations imposed on TPMs, the
WIPO Internet Treaties impose obligations concerning rights management information
(WCT, supra note 2, art. 12; WPPT, supra note 2, art. 19).
Jessica Litman, “Lawful Personal Use” (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman, “Lawful
Personal Use”] at 1872, where Litman states that lawful personal use of copyright
works is progressively shrinking in the U.S. She attributes it to successive copyright
reform of the last decades and the tracking powers of copyright holders with digital
technologies; Elkin-Koren, supra note 8 at 1143-1144, where the author describes the
effect of digital rights management used by copyright holders as redefining the relationship between consumers and copyright holders in a way that is not always transparent to the consumer. It also has the potential of compromising intellectual freedoms.
Supra note 1.
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), amending 17 USC, including the introduction of §§1201–1205 [DMCA]. Countries offering a
lower level of protection of TPMs include Japan, Switzerland, and New Zealand: for a
summary of the main features of the national implementation of TPMs in Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand, see Geist, supra note 123 at 233–236. The European Union
set a framework of implementation for its member states that sits somewhere in the
middle: EC, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in
the information society, [2001] OJ, L167/10 [Directive 2001/29/EC], is the secondary
law that sets the minimum requirements for EU Member States regarding the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 2, and the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright law. Article 6.4 imposes an obligation on Member States to
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respect to the circumvention of access-controls but not for usage-controls.133 The
TPM provisions provide a list of specific exceptions to this new infringement.134
The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing circumstances additional to the ones already listed in the CCA, in which infringement by circumventing access controls does not occur.135 The premise behind forbidding the circumvention of access-controls but not usage-controls is that copyright holders
should legitimately control the lawful access to their works. Once this lawful access
is granted, users should be able to make any lawful use of the copyright work,
including uses that do not require the consent of copyright holders (such as private
copying, fair dealing, and the four new user provisions examined in this article).136
Users should not be liable for infringement if they circumvent usage-controls to
achieve that goal.
At first sight, the creation of a new infringement in the CCA with respect to
the circumvention of access-controls, but not for usage-controls, seems to strike a
balance between the interests of copyright holders and copyright users by restricting infringement to the circumvention of access-controls.137 While copyright law
may not have granted access-controls to copyright holders in the past, it did not
allow users to access copies unlawfully either. This latter issue was addressed in
another legal sphere: criminal law, i.e., theft of a chattel (e.g., copy of a book,
music CD), bypassing library loan privileges, henceforth. Because it was not clear
that acts of circumvention (including circumventing access-controls of copyright
works) would be an actionable wrong — circumvention can take place without any
taking or stealing — a new infringement of circumvention of access-controls was
introduced.138 By conferring this new legal protection for access-controls on copyright holders, the two spheres of control (i.e., rights to the physical copy and exclusive copyright) are now merged under the helm of copyright holders. The expansion of the scope of application of the CCA has made commentators question the
constitutionality of TPMs in a copyright framework.139
The appeal of the balance that TPMs seek to strike between diverging interests
by distinguishing circumvention of access-controls from usage-controls for the purpose of infringement is short-lived. While there is no infringement for circum-
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require copyright holders to make available to beneficiaries of certain exceptions or
limitations to copyright, the means of benefiting from those exceptions and limitations.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1).
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 41.11–41.18. The exceptions include law enforcement and interoperability issues.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.21(2)(a). The factors that the Governor in Council would need
to consider include the extent to which TPMs effectively affect the exercise of fair
dealing under the CCA, ibid.
See the discussion in Part 2 of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1).
Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 45 at 197-198; Jeremy F. de Beer,
“Locks & Levies” (2006) 84 Denv. U.L. Rev. 143 at 152–155.
Jeremy F. de Beer, “Constitutional Jurisdiction over Paracopyright Laws” in Michael
Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2005) ch. 4; Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 45 at 200.
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venting usage-controls for lawful uses, the onus is entirely placed on the users’
ability to circumvent the TPMs with no counterpart obligation to facilitate such
uses by copyright holders.140 Makers of circumventing devices, distributors, service providers, and others are also liable for infringement,141 which diminishes
consumers’ ability to circumvent usage-controls even more, in spite of the lawfulness of their intended uses. Also, the infringement of access-controls under the
CCA can occur independently of an infringement of copyright.142 As one commentator observes, the legal protection of TPMs, as they now form part of the CCA, is
blind to the lawfulness of the use.143 TPMs do not parallel the existing exclusive
rights of copyright holders, but rather endorse an indiscriminate lockout
approach.144
While advocates of TPMs will argue that this is the only effective means to
counterbalance digital piracy, a legal framework that allows the combination of unfettered powers of access-controls with exclusive copyright, and that does not place
the onus on copyright holders to allow lawful uses of their works by “lifting” usage-controls, tilts the balance toward copyright holders even further and imposes
the burden of countering piracy on lawful copyright users. In contrast, countries
granting a lower level of protection to TPMs typically link the infringement of circumvention to an infringement of copyright.145 This link was made in an effort to
address the changes brought on by digital technologies, while preserving the balance between incenting innovation and promoting access and lawful uses of copyright works.
The adoption of a higher level of protection of TPMs in a Canadian context
raises a slew of new questions, even 15 years after the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties and their national implementations worldwide; not the least of
which is: what is the effect of the newly implemented TPMs on Canada’s copyright
users’ rights, as proclaimed in CCH and confirmed in three Supreme Court judgments in 2012?146 The legal protection of TPMs creates confusion around copyright holders’ obligations with respect to acts that users may perform without their
authorization, such as fair dealing, under the private copying regime and the newly
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See the discussion in Part 4.(b) of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1)(b), (c).
The CCA, supra note 2 makes a distinction between acts of circumvention of access
controls which are an infringement of copyright holders’ rights and acts of circumvention of copy controls which are not per se an act of infringement: s. 41.1(1)(a). The
effects of anti-circumvention measures make acts of circumvention of TPMs an infringement of copyright holders’ rights, independently of an act of copyright infringement. This is the model adopted by the U.S.: DMCA, supra note 132.
Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users”, supra note 123 at 192.
Ibid.
Those jurisdictions include Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland: see Geist, supra note
123. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (first
reading 20 June 2005) cl. 27, s. 34.02(1) (one of the earlier attempts to amend the CCA,
supra note 2, to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 2) linked the
infringement of circumvention to the infringement of copyright.
Bell Canada, supra note 5; Alberta, supra note 5; CRTC, supra note 5.
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introduced four user provisions that are discussed in this article.147 Can these uncertainties be remedied through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements?
How do these terms address TPMs and users’ rights?

(c) Terms of Use of Commercial Copies of Copyright Works
Copies of copyright works are made available commercially to consumers
with no contractual terms attached to them148 or, increasingly, with a lengthy list of
non-negotiated standard terms of use.149 In the former case, consumers’ permitted
uses of copies of copyright works are dictated predominantly by the application of
the CCA.150 In the latter case, the effect of these terms of use varies depending on
their enforceability,151 on their nature152 on their interaction with copyright law,153
and on their treatment by sale of goods and consumer protection laws.154 For the
purposes of this article, I will limit my remarks on the interaction between a selected sample of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and exceptions to
copyright infringement or users’ rights as conferred by the CCA. It is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss the debate around the exact nature of terms of use in
intellectual property licences, including non-negotiated standard end-user agree-
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See the discussion in Part 2 and in Part 4 of this article.
This is the case for copies of copyright works sold with a physical supporting medium
exchanged hand to hand such as books, music CDs, film DVDs.
For example, this is the case for e-books, digital films and digital musical recordings
made accessible online with no supporting physical medium exchanged hand to hand:
see the Apple iTunes store terms of services for music downloads, film rentals and
iBooks, online: <http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE>; Netflix
terms of use for audio-visual entertainment streaming services: online at
<https://signup.netflix.com/TermsofUse>; Amazon.com Kindle License Agreement
and Terms of Use, online: <http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/
ref=help_search_1-1?ie=UTF8&nodeId=200506200&qid=1336750645&sr =1-1>; and
KOBO INC. CANADA TERMS OF USE for the purchase of e-books, online:
<http://www.kobobooks.com/termsofuse>.
See Part 2 of this article.
The case law on the enforceability of terms of use varies significantly. The question to
be determined inter alia is whether, based on the manner in which the terms were made
available to users, it can be inferred that they were agreed to by them. For a review of
the enforceability of non-negotiated terms and conditions, Loos, et al., supra note 92 at
65-66.
E.g., whether they form part of a bilateral agreement or of a unilateral licence will have
an impact inter alia on their scope, the remedies available in case of breach, etc.
More specifically, whether there are provisions in copyright law that are mandatory
and cannot be overridden by contract: see the discussion in Part 4 of this article (in
particular Part 4.(c)).
I refer here more specifically to how sale of goods and consumer protection laws may
affect the applicability of copyright works standard terms of use, including through the
application of implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession,
prohibitions against unfair terms and information disclosure requirements.
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ments.155 For the intents of the present discussion, I will focus on restrictive terms
of use that are considered binding enforceable terms.156
There are common denominators and noticeable variances between what suppliers permit and forbid consumers to do with copies of copyright works lawfully
accessed. The permitted purpose of the uses is most often defined as “personal” and
“non-commercial” uses.157 Consumers are usually forbidden to produce derivative
or transformative uses with the copies of copyright works that they lawfully accessed.158 Also, they have no right to transfer the copy of the copyright work that
they lawfully acquired.159 Consumers are typically not notified of their rights or of
copyright exceptions under copyright laws or on how they may exercise such
rights.160 There are indications that copyright holders often disregard those users’
rights or exceptions to copyright infringement.161 The right to make copies of the
copyright work for personal non-commercial uses varies greatly from no right to
make copies162 to the right to make an unlimited number of copies.163 There is also
a noticeable variance in the uses of TPMs from none164 to ones restricting access,
ones restricting uses once access is granted, and the ones restricting both the access
to and the uses of copyright works. Some suppliers inform consumers of the exis-
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The nature of intellectual property licence terms (e.g., bilateral contracts, unilateral
licences) is unclear and their treatment is not always consistent. For a discussion on the
nature of intellectual property licences and the parallels to be made with tangible property, see: Mark R. Patterson, “Must Licenses be Contracts? Consent and Notice in
Intellectual Property” (2012) 40 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 105. See also Robinson, supra note
99.
For a review of the enforceability of non-negotiated terms and conditions, see Loos, et
al., supra note 92 at 65-66. See also Radin, supra note 92, in particular at 1-32.
This is the case of major suppliers of online audio, audio-visual and e-books products,
see supra note 149.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See The Hargreaves Report, which was commissioned by U.K. Prime Minister in 2010:
Ian Hargreaves, “Digital Opportunity, a Review of Intellectual Property and Growth”
2011 at 51, where the author refers to a study that analyzed 100 contracts referred to
the British Library (i.e., submission by Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance
(LACA)) and that demonstrated that contracts and licences often override the exceptions and limitations allowed in copyright law.
See the Kobo books terms of use for e-books, supra note 149.
See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 149, where no
limits to copy apply to iTunes Plus Products, and users may make as many copies “as
reasonably necessary for personal, non-commercial use.”
See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 149, where it is
specified that a particular product, “iTunes Plus Products do not contain security technology that limits your usage of such products.”

28

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[26 I.P.J.]

tence of TPMs on the copies of copyright work they provide to consumers,165
while others make no reference to their existence.166
Non-negotiated standard end-user agreements tend to overlook exceptions to
copyright infringement or users’ rights as they are set out in the CCA and similar
statutes in other jurisdictions. To understand the effect of non-negotiated standard
end-user agreements on the copyright design, in particular the extent to which they
may take precedence over exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights,167
requires the investigation of two related questions. What is the exact nature and
scope of these permitted uses or exceptions to copyright infringement? Are they
mandatory? This will be explored next.

4. EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: RIGHTS OR
PRIVILEGES? ARE THEY MANDATORY?
Whether exceptions to copyright infringement may qualify as rights, or privileges or mere defences to copyright infringement is an important component of the
broader task of defining consumers’ rights to commercial copies of copyright
works. This question is gaining more importance for consumers as the recent
amendments to the CCA expand the instances under which copyright users may
perform acts without the authorization of copyright holders.168 Whether exceptions
to copyright infringement are mandatory is of equal importance in an environment
where copies of copyright works are increasingly commercialized through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. I look at these two questions sequentially.

(a) The Nature of Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
The qualification of exceptions to copyright infringement as rights, or as privileges or mere defences has important legal ramifications for consumers and other
users. Based on Wesley Hohfeld’s theory of jural correlatives,169 lawful consumers
have a legal claim against copyright holders to exercise exceptions to copyright
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Apple iTunes store terms of use for audio, audio-visual works and e-books, supra note
149, make general reference to TPMs being applied to certain of the iTune store
services.
See the Kobo books terms of use for e-books, supra note 149.
I.e., as they are set out in the CCA, supra note 2, and similar statutes in other jurisdictions: see Part 2 of this article.
See the discussion in Part 2 of this article.
I.e., that someone’s right implies that someone has a duty towards it. A privilege is the
ability to do something with no correlation from anyone obligated towards it (no right).
For example, a defence to copyright infringement would qualify as a privilege to the
extent that it allows a user to perform certain acts without authorization but does not
require copyright holders to facilitate the exercise of these acts. See Wesley N.
Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”
(1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16 at 30-31. See also Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710.
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infringement170 that they lawfully access if they are rights,171 but not if they are
privileges or mere defences to copyright infringement.172 This is particularly relevant when TPMs restrict the exercise of an otherwise permitted act.173 By contrast,
an exception to copyright infringement is a privilege to the extent that it does not
impose any duty on copyright holders, such as to facilitate the performance of a
permitted act. At the same time, it leaves consumers free to make the permitted use
as they please, unless the exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory,
and are restricted by contract or by TPMs.174 If exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory privileges, any attempt by copyright holders to restrain the
exercise of the exceptions is not enforceable.175 As a result, mandatory user rights
offer the strongest form of protection for copyright consumers and other users,
while non-mandatory privileges offer them the weakest form of protection. Between the two poles, a mandatory privilege does not impose any obligation on copyright holders to facilitate the exercise of an act permitted under an exception to
copyright infringement, but at the same time, any obstacle imposed by copyright
holders restricting the performance of the said act by consumers is non-enforceable,
leaving consumers free to perform an act otherwise permitted by an exception to
copyright infringement. A user right that may be superseded by contract is weaker
in mass market environments where non-negotiated standard end-user agreements
prevail, to the extent that it is subject to contract terms that may negate it.176
The Supreme Court of Canada stated unanimously in CCH, and reaffirmed in
three judgments in 2012,177 that exceptions to copyright infringement are “more
properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence”178 and are users’ rights.179 The Supreme Court could have referred to ex-
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E.g., the right to make copies for private purposes or fair dealing.
Unless they are not mandatory and have been restricted by the copyright holder in a
binding agreement.
See the discussion further below in Part 4.(a) of this article on the French cases Warner
Music and Mullholland Drive.
See the discussion on the nature and effects of TPMs in Part 3.(b) of this article.
In the case of TPMs blocking the permitted use, consumers would be allowed to circumvent usage-control TPMs to perform a permitted act, provided that they have the
technical ability to do so: see the discussion on TPMs in Part 3.(b) of this article. I
discuss whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory in Part 4.(c), below. In the case of TPMs blocking the permitted use, the consumer would be allowed
to circumvent the TPMs to perform a permitted act.
Hohfeld, supra note 169. On the distinction between mandatory exceptions and
mandatory rights, see Dusollier 2007, supra note 127 at 483-484.
For a discussion on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement and on
their mandatory nature, see Dusollier 2007, supra note 127 at 477–511.
Bell Canada, supra note 5, Alberta, supra note 5, CRTC, supra note 5.
CCH, supra note 3 at para. 48, referring here specifically to the fair dealing exception
to copyright infringement.
Ibid.; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at para. 11; CRTC, supra note 5 at paras. 36, 58.
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ceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights,180 but instead it explicitly referred
to them as rights. This qualification by the Supreme Court of exceptions to copyright infringement contrasts with the one made by courts in other jurisdictions including France, that have held that exceptions to copyright infringement are mere
defences that cannot form the basis of a legal claim.181 The U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988182 suggests that exceptions to copyright infringement
are not rights.183 The view that exceptions to copyright infringement do not constitute rights in the sense that they implicate duties on the part of copyright holders, as
per Hohfeld’s theory of jural correlatives, is also shared by copyright scholars.184
The consequences of the distinction between rights and mere defences to copyright infringement are illustrated in the French case Warner Music.185 The Tribunal of first instance had ordered the rescission of the sale of CDs for digital music
on the basis that the CD, which contained TPMs, could not be used on a specific
kind of laptop. The CD contained a notification of the TPMs and stated that it could
be read on most CD players and computers. The Tribunal held that this incompati-
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The title preceding CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29ff, refers to “Exceptions.” Exceptions or
defences to copyright infringement is how these limitations of copyright holders’ exclusive rights are commonly referred to: see Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 9;
The WCT, supra note 2, art. 10 and the WPPT, supra note 2, art. 16, also refer to
“exceptions” and “limitations” of the exclusive rights of copyright holders.
See the discussion below in Part 4.(a) of this article on the French cases Warner Music
and Mulholland Drive. See Law.co.il, “Israeli Supreme Court: circumvention of copyright protection is not prohibited” online: <http://www.law.co.il/news/israeli_ internet_law_update/2013/09/05/IL-Supreme-court-permits-access-control-circum- vention/>, referring to a 2013 judgment by the Israeli Supreme Court: Telran
Communications (1986) Ltd. v. Charlton Ltd. (in Hebrew) whereby Law.co.il reports
that Justice Zvil Zilbertal stated: “contrary to the ruling in the Hebrew University case,
that even if ‘permitted uses’ are deemed a defense and not a legal right, the defense
can apply to the middleman as well.” [emphasis added]. See also: Séverine Dusollier,
“Copie privée v. mesures techniques de protection: l’exception est-elle un droit?” note
sous Prés. Bruxelles (cess.), 25 mai (2004) 4 Auteurs & Média, 338 at 342–344 where
the author argues in a Belgian context that exceptions to copyright infringement are not
rights.
Chap. 48.
Ibid., s. 28 (1) which states with respect to acts permitted in relation to copyright
works: “The provisions of this article specify acts which may be done in relation to
copyright works notwithstanding the subsistence of copyright; they relate only to the
question of infringement of copyright and do not affect any other right or obligation
restricting the doing of any of the specified acts.” (emphasis added)
For a review of the literature and case law on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement see Dusollier 2007, supra note 127 at 477–494, in particular at
481–485 regarding the arguments against qualifying exceptions to copyright infringements as rights. See also David Vaver, “Copyright Defenses as User Rights” (2013) J.
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 14 (forthcoming), who hesitates to qualify exceptions to
copyright infringement as rights with correlative duties in Hohfeld terms, or that can be
transferred, but acknowledging that they are nevertheless entitlements.
Trib. gr. inst. 5ieme Paris, 10 January 2006, Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir / Warner
Music France, Fnac (2006) JurisData: 2006-292685.
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bility with some computers constituted a latent defect under the French Code
Civil.186 The Tribunal also ordered Warner Music France to remove TPMs from
the CDs it distributed as TPMs prevented consumers from making private copies of
the digital music. The Tribunal held that this annulled de facto the limit set by the
legislator on the exclusive right of authors, which allowed individuals to make private copies.187 The Court of Appeal reversed the two orders of the Tribunal outlined above.188 It reversed the first order on the ground of deficient evidence of the
existence of a latent defect.189 It reversed the second order on the basis that the
private copying exception to authors’ rights was not a right but a defence.190 Hence
it could not be the basis for the initiation of a claim.191 The same approach was
adopted by the French Court of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation in the Mulholland Drive case.192 By contrast to the French cases of Warner Brothers and Mulholland Drive, can the Supreme Court of Canada qualification of exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights serve as the basis of claims by users against
copyright holders who restrict the performance of acts otherwise permitted under
those exceptions? Are such exceptions mandatory?
Determining whether exceptions to copyright infringement should give rise to
legal claims against copyright holders to allow users the performance of the restricted act, as opposed to a privilege, calls in question the balance that needs to be
achieved between the scope of copyright holders’ and users’ rights to lawful copies
of copyright works. The role of exceptions to copyright infringement to balance
competing interests as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Théberge,193 was emphasized by the same court in CCH, Bell Canada and CRTC.194
The qualification by the Supreme Court of exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights in CCH, and subsequently in Bell Canada, Alberta and
CRTC, has served as a rule of interpretation that gives more prominence than it
ever did before to the interests of copyright users.195 The rule of interpretation has
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Art. 1641 CcF.
As per art. L 122-5, L 211-3 CPI.
CA Paris, 20 June 2007, Fnac Paris / UFC Que Choisir et autres (2007) Juris Data
2007-337236.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. Confirmed by the Cour de cassation, Cass, civ. 1ère, 27 November 2008, UFC
Que Choisir / Fnac, Warner music France (2008) JurisData 2008-046005.
CA, Paris, 4 April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v. S. Perquin and Union fédérale des
consommateurs Que choisir, Gaz. Pal. 18/07/2007 Nº 199, 23; confirmed by the Cour
de Cassation: Cass civ 1st, 19 juin 2008 (2008) Bull civ, I, Nº 177.
Théberge, supra note 14 at para. 30.
The objective of the CCA to balance competing objectives as stated in Théberge, ibid.,
was referred to in the context of interpreting the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement in CCH, supra note 3 at para. 10; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 8ff;
CRTC, supra note 5 at paras. 64ff. See also Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at paras.
88-89.
CCH, supra note 3 at para. 48; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 9–11.
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guided the Supreme Court and lower courts in their determination of the scope of
exceptions to copyright infringement.196 The Supreme Court relied on its qualification of exceptions as users rights to justify that the allowed purposes under the fair
dealing provisions need to be interpreted broadly.197 The qualification of exceptions as users’ rights further led the Supreme Court in Alberta and Bell Canada to
hold that exceptions have to be interpreted from the perspective of the user, not
copyright holders.198 More recently, the Supreme Court held that a value for signal
regime set up by the CRTC was ultra vires of its powers as it, inter alia, effectively
allowed broadcasters to control the simultaneous retransmission of works while
section 31 of the CCA, a user’s right, explicitly restricts them from doing so.199
How should users’ rights, as a rule of interpretation, guide us in determining
whether exceptions to copyright infringement give rise to positive claims against
copyright holders restricting their exercise or rather that they constitute privileges?
Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights or privileges requires
a closer look at their nature and function. The essence of exceptions to copyright
infringement is to allow lawful copyright users to perform certain acts on copyright
works without the authorization of copyright holders with or without remuneration.
As a precondition, it would seem that the performance of the act being constrained
by copyright holders needs to be identifiable as falling under an exception to copyright infringement. While certain acts can be readily identifiable as falling under an
exception to copyright infringement, in other instances it may not be clear for copyright users. The delineation of some exceptions is reasonably clear (e.g., private
copying regime, reproduction for private purposes, backup copies, exceptions relating to computer programs) while the contour of others is to be assessed on a case
by case basis with the development and support of judge-made rules (e.g., fair dealing, non-substantial part doctrine). Also, to maintain the integrity of the essence of
exceptions to copyright infringement, i.e., as not requiring the authorization of copyright holders, the circumvention of the obstacle to perform the act (e.g., TPMs)
should be both lawful and reasonably accessible.
The lack of certainty, i.e., whether certain acts fall within the scope of an exception to copyright infringement, should not be a bar per se to qualify exceptions
as rights giving rise to claims. The acts that are readily known to fall within an
exception to copyright infringement should give rise to claims against copyright
holders in case of obstacles to their exercise, while the acts for which it is uncertain
196

In CCH, supra note 3 at paras. 48ff; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 8ff; Alberta,
supra note 5 at paras. 12ff, the Supreme Court characterized exceptions to copyright
infringement as users’ rights and applied a broad interpretation of the fair dealing provisions to determine whether the alleged infringing acts fell under their scope. In
CRTC, supra note 5 at para. 69, the court held that a value for signal regime set up by
the CRTC was ultra vires of its powers as it, inter alia, effectively allowed broadcasters to control the simultaneous retransmission of works while section 31 of the CCA,
supra note 2, an exception to copyright infringement explicitly restricts them from doing so. See also SOCAN, supra note 194.
197 CCH, supra note 3 at paras. 48ff; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 8ff; Alberta,
supra note 5 at paras. 12ff.
198 Alberta, supra note 5 at para. 22; Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 29, 30, 34.
199 CRTC, supra note 5 at para. 69, referring to CCA, supra note 2, s. 31.
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that the exception would apply could be ascertained later on, e.g., through court
judgments. However, the indeterminacy of the scope of exceptions to copyright
infringement raises practical issues to the extent that users will be less prone to
assert claims with respect to acts that do not clearly fall within the exceptions than
the ones that do, for the fear of being held liable for copyright infringement. Such
practical difficulties are not restricted to the exercise of rights giving rise to claims;
they also apply to the exercise of privileges.
With respect to the obstacles posed by TPMs on the exercise of exceptions to
copyright infringement, the introduction of TPMs does not necessarily foreclose the
possibility that exceptions to copyright infringement can give rise to a positive
claim by users against copyright holders to allow them to perform the lawful act,
and therefore qualify as rights in Hohfeld terms. While I have argued above in this
paper that the endorsement of TPMs in a manner that disregards the lawfulness of
the intended use, strips exceptions to copyright infringement of one of their core
features,200 it is not entirely clear whether the introduction of TPMs in the CCA in
2012 necessarily negates the proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement
are rights giving rise to claims.201 What is clearer is that the introduction of TPMs
effectively creates a hierarchy between the exceptions to copyright infringement as
I discuss below.202
A more central question to assess whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights in Hohfeld terms is the legal base under which users can ascertain
their claim against copyright holders. While the CCA provides myriad of remedies
available to copyright holders when copyright infringement occurs,203 it does not
provide any remedies for copyright users. Users could seek a declaratory judgment
to confirm that certain uses fall under an exception to copyright infringement but
this does not confirm per se the existence of a right giving rise to a legal claim.
Users could ascertain claims under other laws, e.g., consumer or sale of goods law
breach of an implied obligation of fitness for purpose or quiet possession, but following the reasoning of the French case Warner Brothers,204 the claim could only
be made on the basis that exceptions to copyright infringement are rights in
Hohfeld terms,205 which remains unclear. The absence of readily identifiable legal
procedures and designated remedies under which copyright users can make a claim
against copyright users would be a more serious obstacle to qualify exceptions to
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I.e., not having to ask the authorization of copyright holders to perform the permitted
acts. This is particularly true for users who do not have the technical ability or means to
circumvent TPMs to perform the otherwise lawful act without the help of copyright
holders. See the discussion on TPMs in Part 3.(b) of this article where I describe how
TPMs introduced in 2012 the CCA, supra note 2 do not make the circumvention of
usage-controls for the performance of lawful acts an infringement of copyright holders’
exclusive rights.
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(i) and (ii), below.
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(i) and (ii) below.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 34ff.
See supra note 185, 188 and 191.
See supra note 169.
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copyright infringement as rights, than the potential lack of clarity of scope of the
exceptions and the introduction in 2012 of TPMs in the CCA.
The recent amendments to the CCA raise questions about the scope of users’
rights that vary between the different permitted uses that the CCA confers to copyright users. I explore next the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement as they
are currently set out in the CCA by distinguishing between those exceptions that are
not subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are.

(b) The Scope of Users’ Rights Under the CCA
The amendments to the CCA in 2012 introduced the legal protection of
TPMs.206 The amendments created various new infringements, including the circumvention of access-controls to copies of copyright works.207 No exception applies to acts of circumvention to perform acts that are specifically authorized by the
CCA, such as fair dealing, private copying, and the four newly introduced user provisions that I discussed earlier in this article.208 By contrast, acts of circumvention
of usage-control TPMs do not constitute a separate copyright infringement.209
The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs in the CCA raises additional
areas of uncertainty regarding the scope of users’ rights as described in CCH, at
least when copyright holders distribute their works commercially with TPMs. Do
the exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights subsist in all cases when
copyright holders make their copyright works available with TPMs or are they superseded by TPMs as they are now legally endorsed by the CCA? The following
analysis does not apply to copies of copyright works that are made available without TPMs. I explore the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement as they are
currently set out in the CCA by distinguishing between those exceptions that are not
subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are.

(i) Exceptions to Copyright Infringement not Subject to the NonCircumvention of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)
The legal status of fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private
copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine,
and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement are affected peripherally by the introduction of the legal protection of TPMs in the CCA.210 On the one hand, consumers who circumvent accesscontrol technologies and then perform an act that is a users’ right, such as a fair
dealing with the work, would be liable for the separate infringement of circumventing access-control technologies regardless of their subsequent lawful use of the
copyright work.211 This infringement would have no bearing on the legality of the
fair dealing, private copying, non-substantial part, exercise of computer program
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See the discussion in Part 3.(b) of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1)(a).
See the discussion in Part 2 of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1)(a). See also DMCA, supra note 132, §1201.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 41 to 41.21.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1)(a).
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exception, exhaustion, first sale doctrine, or non-commercial user-generated content, which would be assessed on their own merits. On the other hand, consumers
are not forbidden to circumvent user-control technologies to perform those users’
rights.212 In other words, consumers are not infringing copyright holders’ rights if
they circumvent usage-control technologies, if their use of the copyright work is
otherwise lawful, including if their dealing of the work is fair, or if they wish to
exercise the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to
copyright infringement.
The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs makes the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights as characterized in CCH even more
unclear than it was before. Assuming for the intents of our discussion that the Supreme Court judgment imposes positive obligations on copyright holders to allow
the permissible uses (as per the Hohfeldian model of jural correlatives of rights and
duties), the introduction of the legal protection of TPMs adds a new layer of complexity. One interpretation is that TPMs effectively allow copyright holders who
apply usage-control TPMs to override users’ rights (rights understood here as imposing positive obligations on copyright holders to allow permitted acts) and convert them to exceptions to copyright infringement or privileges. In essence, this
amounts to a “halfway house” overriding effect. Another interpretation is that they
leave users’ rights as characterized by CCH (and as understood in Hohfeldian
terms) more or less intact. While they confer more protection on copyright holders
by creating additional hurdles against would-be unlawful users, they still require
copyright holders to facilitate permitted uses by lawful users either proactively or at
least at users’ request. Even if the second interpretation on the effect of the TPMs
introduced in the CCA preserves the effects of CCH better than the first interpretation, this illustrates how the TPM provisions effectively weaken users’ rights. The
TPM provisions do so by imposing an additional hurdle for consumers (who do not
have the ability to circumvent the usage-controls) to ask permission when the essence of their right is that they do not need copyright holders’ authorization in the
first place, let alone the disincentive to exercise those rights and the additional legal
uncertainty that the newly introduced legal protection of TPMs creates around the
existence and scope of such users’ rights.213 This is unprecedented in Canadian
copyright law.

(ii) Exceptions to Copyright Infringement Subject to the Non-Circumvention
of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)
The newly introduced legal protection of TPMs have more drastic effects on
the scope of the users’ rights examined here than the ones analyzed earlier,214 for
copyright works that are made commercially available with TPMs. In that case, the

212

Ibid. the circumvention act is an infringement only if it relates to access-control TPMs,
not usage-control ones.
213 Hargreaves, supra note 161 at 51 who discusses the detrimental effects that contract
terms that restrict users’ rights have on legal certainty about the very existence of those
rights which makes him conclude that users’ rights should be made mandatory.
214 I.e., the users’ rights examined earlier are: fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale
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CCA makes the existence of those rights explicitly subject to not circumventing
access-control and usage-control technologies.215 Consumers and other users may,
without the authorization of copyright holders, perform reproduction for private
purposes, fix signals, record programs for later listening or viewing, and create
backup copies subject to not circumventing access-control or usage-control technologies that restrict them from doing so.216 If they do, the acts they perform no
longer fall under these user rights provisions and may infringe copyright, unless
they are authorized under other provisions of the CCA.217 They may also be liable
for the separate act of infringement for the circumvention of access-control
technologies.218
Through the effect of TPMs on the user rights examined in the present section,
the CCA effectively creates a hierarchy of users’ rights: unlike the users’ rights
examined earlier,219 the newly introduced reproduction for private purposes, fixing
signals, recording programs for later listening or viewing, and backup copies users’
rights are “default rights” that exist subject to copyright holders’ application of access-control or usage-control TPMs. The CCA explicitly allows copyright holders
to override these rights through the use of TPMs. That is, even after consumers
gain lawful access to the copyright work, copyright holders restraining consumers’
uses through usage-control technologies effectively annihilate their right to exercise
one of the exceptions to copyright infringement examined here without copyright
holders’ consent (and unlike the exceptions examined previously where circumvention of usage-controls does not amount to an infringement of copyright).220
The amendments brought on to the CCA in 2012 effectively created a hierarchy of users’ rights, occasioned by the effect that TPMs have on certain exceptions
to copyright infringement and not on others.221 In the first category of users’ rights
examined above, users’ circumvention of existing usage-control TPMs to perform
their users’ rights will not infringe copyright.222 In the second category of users’
rights examined above, users’ circumvention of existing usage-control TPMs negates their user right, which is conditional on not circumventing existing TPMs.223
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doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to
copyright infringement as discussed in Part 4.(b)(i) of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.22(1)(c), 29.23(1)(b), 29.24(1)(c).
Ibid.
Such as under the fair dealing provisions of the CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29 to 29.2.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 41.1(1)(a).
E.g., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced
non-commercial user-generated content rights examined earlier in Part 4.(b)(i) of this
article.
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(i) of this article.
I.e., the exceptions to copyright infringement are divided into two categories based on
how the existence of the exception to copyright infringement is incumbent upon not
circumventing any usage-control TPMs in one case (Part 4.(b)(ii), above) and not in the
other (see Part 4.(b)(i), above).
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(i), above.
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(ii), above.
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Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights the restriction of which
gives rise to a legal claim leads to another important question on the interaction
between the CCA and contracts: are copyright exceptions or users’ rights
mandatory? Should a difference be made between negotiated and non-negotiated
contracts?

(c) Are Exceptions to Copyright Infringement Mandatory?
Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory is a distinct field
of inquiry from their nature as rights, privileges or defences discussed above, yet it
is equally important to assess consumers’ and other users’ rights to commercial
copies of copyright works.224 While exceptions to copyright infringement confer
greater benefits on users if they constitute rights as opposed to privileges,225 potentially they are weakened significantly if they are not mandatory, especially with
respect to consumer transactions subject to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. A mandatory exception makes a contract term to the contrary unenforceable,
while a non-mandatory user right can be the basis of a legal claim only to the extent
that it has not been overridden by enforceable contract terms.226
The mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is an unsettled
area of the law that is gaining a revived interest among copyright scholars, especially with the recent introduction of the legal protection of TPMs worldwide.227
Unlike other jurisdictions, the CCA does not explicitly state whether exceptions to
copyright infringement are mandatory.228 Does this silence mean that exceptions to
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See the discussion in Part 4.(a) and (b) of this article. Exceptions to copyright infringement as set out in the CCA, supra note 2 are either mandatory or non-mandatory rights,
or mandatory or non-mandatory privileges or defences.
Ibid.
The significance of the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is
illustrated by the French case Studio Canal where the Court of Appeal had ruled that
the private copying was an exception to copyright infringement (not a right) but that it
was nonetheless mandatory; any attempts by Studio Canal to limit its exercise was nonenforceable. The Cour de cassation (Cass civ. 1st, 28 February 2006, (2006) Bull civ
05-15.824) overturned the Court of Appeal judgment (CA Paris, 22 April 2005 (2005)
JurisData 2005-268600) which had forbidden Les Films Alain Sarde and Studio Canal
to apply TPMs that were incompatible with private copying as an exception to copyright infringement, and held that the private copying exception was not mandatory.
I discuss TPMs in Part 3.(b) of this article. An entire book is devoted to the question of
the mandatory nature of limitations to copyright holders’ exclusive rights: see Guibault,
supra note 107; see also De Werra, supra note 95; Dusollier 2007, supra note 127 at
495–511; Estelle Derclaye, “Copyright Contracts, Public Policy and Antitrust, in Christopher Heath and Kung-Chung Liu, eds., Copyright Law and the Information Society in
Asia, IIC Studies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 167–226; U.K., Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property, The relationship between copyright and contract
law, by Martin Kretschmer, et al., 2010, online: <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearchrelation-201007.pdf>.
For example, this is the case of Belgium copyright law under which most limitations of
copyright are mandatory with an exception in the case of on-demand services: Loi du
30 juin 1994 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins, online:
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copyright infringement are not mandatory? To what extent is the user right jurisprudence by the Supreme Court relevant to this question?
The consequence of the absence of explicit reference to the mandatory nature
of exceptions to copyright infringement gives rise to diverging opinions.229 For
some commentators having conducted a comparative study on the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, no definitive conclusion can be derived from statutory silence on that question.230 For others, the answer varies based
on the underlying justifications of the exceptions to copyright infringement. Exceptions that are justified by fundamental rights may not be overridden by contract,
while the ones that are justified on other grounds, e.g., public policy considerations
may.231 The same reasoning applies to exceptions to copyright infringement that
are justified by market failures, i.e., they may be overridden by contract to the extent that the market failure disappears with new technologies.232 Relying on the
underlying justifications of exceptions to copyright infringement to elucidate
whether exceptions are mandatory may not be all that satisfactory given the debate
and uncertainty around what the proper justifications should be.233
The jurisprudence by the Supreme Court on copyright user rights may support
the proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory, at least
with respect to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. Through CCH, Bell
Canada, Alberta and CRTC, users’ rights have become an important tool giving
shape to the objective of the CCA to maintain a balance between competing interests, as it was enunciated by the same court in Théberge.234 In CCH, the Supreme
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<http://www.sacd.be/Legislation-belge-du-droit-d?lang=fr>, art. 23bis. See also EC,
Council and Parliament Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection
of computer programs, [2009] OJ L 111/16 [Directive 2009/24/EC] where some exceptions to copyright infringement related to computer programs cannot be limited by contract: art. 5(2) and (3).
See Guibault, supra note 107 at 214–240, 263–277; 291, 296–302: based on her analysis of E.U. and U.S. copyright and other laws, she concluded that there is no definite
mean to determine whether limitations to copyright are mandatory or not, unless the
relevant copyright laws state explicitly so. De Werra, supra note 95 at 336-336 takes
the position in a European context, that copyright limitations that are grounded in fundamental rights (e.g., freedom of expression) cannot be overridden by contract but that
most other limitations can.
Guibault, supra note 107.
De Werra, supra note 95 at 335-336. See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 127 at
507–509.
De Werra, supra note 95 at 336-337.
The justifications of exceptions to copyright infringement are part of the broader discussion on the theoretical justifications of copyright and users’ rights to copies of copyright works: I discuss the various theoretical justifications of copy ownership and
users’ rights in Chapdelaine, supra note 23 at 199–224. See also De Werra, supra note
95 at 333–335 on the debate on the theoretical justifications that withstand the right to
make private copies, i.e., the extent to which it is based on the right to privacy.
The objective of the CCA, supra note 2, to balance competing objectives as stated in
Théberge, supra note 14 at para. 30 as referred to in the context of interpreting the
scope of exceptions to copyright infringement in CCH, supra note 3 at para. 10; Bell
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Court characterized exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights as users’
rights, and not mere loopholes in the CCA.235 In Bell Canada, Alberta and CRTC,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the user rights’ nature of exceptions to copyright
infringement and provided further insights into the consequences of this qualification: exceptions as user rights need to be interpreted from the perspective of users,
not copyright holders.236
Of particular significance to the discussion on the mandatory nature of exceptions is CRTC, where Rothstein J. for the majority, held that a value for signal
regime set up by the CRTC was ultra vires of its powers because it effectively
tempered with the balance set out by Parliament in the CCA between copyright
holders’ exclusive rights and exceptions to copyright infringement:
In my view, s. 21(1) represents the expression by Parliament of the appropriate balance to be struck between broadcasters’ rights in their communication signals and the rights of the users, including BDUs, to those signals. It
would be incoherent for Parliament to set up a carefully tailored signals retransmission right in the Copyright Act, specifically excluding BDUs from
the scope of the broadcasters’ exclusive rights over the simultaneous retransmission of their signals, only to enable a subordinate legislative body to
enact a functionally equivalent right through a related regime. The value for
signal regime would upset the aim of the Copyright Act to effect an appropriate “balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator” (Théberge, at para. 30).237

Commenting on the effects of the CRTC regime on the exception to copyright infringement set out in section 31 of the CCA, Rothstein J., for the majority, added:
Again, although the exception to copyright infringement established in s. 31
on its face does not purport to prohibit another regulator from imposing conditions, directly or indirectly, on the retransmission of works, it is necessary
to look behind the letter of the provision to its purpose, which is to balance
the entitlements of copyright holders and the public interest in the dissemination of works. The value for signal regime would effectively overturn the
s. 31 exception to the copyright owners’ s. 3(1)(f) communication right. It
would disrupt the balance established by Parliament.238

The court held that the value for signal regime of the CRTC would “rewrite the
balance between the owners’ and users’ interests as set out by Parliament in the
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Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 8ff; CRTC, supra note 5 at paras. 64ff. See also Society
of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at paras. 88-89.
CCH, supra note 3 at para. 48.
Bell Canada, supra note 5 at paras. 29ff and Alberta, supra note 5 at para. 22 whereby
the Supreme Court stated that the applicability of exceptions to copyright infringement
or users’ rights needs to be assessed from the perspective of users. In CRTC, supra note
5 at paras. 36, 58, where the court reiterated that exceptions to copyright infringement
are users’ rights.
CRTC, supra note 5 at para. 67.
Ibid., at para. 70.
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Copyright Act.”239 Is the effect by extension, of the majority judgment in CRTC,
that copyright holders’ exclusive rights and their exceptions may not be altered by
contract? An important distinction needs to be made between the effects of a regime set out by the CRTC, a public body, and the one established by private parties
through contract. However, CRTC may support the proposition that copyright holders cannot override exceptions to copyright infringement through mass market nonnegotiated standard end-user agreements to the extent that the effect would be to
alter Parliament’s balance set out in the CCA, building on the “fundamental functional equivalence” reasoning by the Supreme Court.240
In parallel to the Supreme Court jurisprudence on users’ rights, the 2012
amendments to the CCA bring another dimension on whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory.241 Given the silence of the CCA on the
mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, and the uncertain interaction between the 2012 amendments to the CCA and the user rights jurisprudence
by the Supreme Court, are their other indicators that can help determine whether
exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory? In my view, the inquiry as to
whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory requires a different
analysis between two categories of users’ rights that is based on their different interaction with the TPMs recently introduced in the CCA.
In the first category, i.e., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the
private copying regime, and non-commercial user-generated content exceptions,
there is a reasonable (but not conclusive) argument to be made that those rights
may not be set aside by copyright holders through non-negotiated standard end-user
agreements. The stronger public policy underpinnings that withstand the exercise of
fair dealing,242 the non-commercial user-generated content provisions in incentivizing the creation of new works,243 and the automatic levy that is built into the
private copying regime244 could support the argument that these exceptions to copyright infringement may not be overridden at the will of copyright holders. The
mandatory nature of these user rights, at least with respect to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, would be more consistent with the Supreme Court juris-

239
240

241

242
243
244

Ibid., at para. 76.
CRTC, supra note 5 at para. 82, where while the court in its majority judgment recognized that the regime set out by the CRTC could not amend the CCA, this is effectively
what it did, pointing to the “fundamental functional equivalence between the proposed
regime and a copyright.”
In particular, with the addition of TPMs, and with the hierarchy of user rights that the
2012 amendments to the CCA create by explicitly subjecting the existence of exceptions to copyright infringement to not circumventing access-control or usage-control
TPMs: see the discussion further below in Part 4.(c) of this article.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29–29.2, with respect to some or all of the required purposes for
the application of the fair dealing provisions.
CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21.
CCA, supra note 2, ss. 79ff.
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prudence on user rights and the CCA’s objectives to preserve a balance between
competing interests.245
The interaction of these user rights (i.e., fair dealing, the non-substantial part
doctrine, the private copying regime, and non-commercial user-generated content
exception) with the legal protection of TPMs introduced in the CCA also suggests
that there is recognition of the special status for these exceptions to copyright infringement. While their exercise may be impaired by the presence of TPMs, the
existence of these users’ rights is not subject to the respect of TPMs. It is true that
the CCA does not specifically require copyright holders to “lift” their usage-control
technologies to allow consumers and other users to perform those acts that are usually permitted without the authorization of copyright holders. At the same time,
consumers are allowed to circumvent usage-control technologies without infringing
copyright by doing so.246 These accommodations between the legal protection of
TPMs and users’ rights, albeit imperfect, may signal Parliament’s intent to make
room for the exercise of users’ rights. As I discussed above, the interaction between
the TPMs and the users’ rights in question247 would convert them from mandatory
rights to mandatory privileges.
The mandatory nature of the second category of user rights (i.e., the reproduction for private purposes, fixing signals and recording programs for later listening
or viewing and backup copies exceptions) is less probable although there is no clear
answer to that question either. As discussed above, the CCA explicitly subjects the
existence of those rights to the non-circumvention of access-control and usage-control TPMs.248 The second category of users’ rights examined here being explicitly
subject to TPMs effectively allows copyright holders to override these rights when
they commercialize their works with TPMs. By virtue of an interpretation by extension, copyright holders could also override these users’ rights by restrictive contract
terms because Parliament already signalled the non-obligatory nature of these
users’ rights. In a more restrictive interpretation, these users’ rights may only be
restricted by TPMs: if Parliament intended that they could be restricted otherwise,
it would explicitly have stated so.
Beyond the proper statutory interpretation of the consequences of the silence
of the CCA on the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, I
want to reflect here on the underlying justifications for supporting or rejecting
mandatory exceptions to copyright infringement and the implications that each position has on the overall objectives and framework of the CCA. The argument that
is frequently invoked against making exceptions to copyright infringement
mandatory is that it would impede freedom of contract and constrain the flexibility
of how copyright holders exploit their exclusive rights.249 The arguments invoked
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Théberge, supra note 14 at para. 30; CMA, supra note 1, Preamble, 6th paragraph. See
the discussion above in Part 4.(c) of this article.
See the discussion in Part 4.(b)(i) of this article.
I.e., the users’ rights examined in Part 4.(b)(i) of this article: fair dealing, non-substantial part, private copying regime and non-commercial user-generated content.
See the discussion in Part 2.(b), (c), (d).
See, for example, Barry Sookman, “Copyright Reform for Canada: What Should We
Do? A Submission to the Copyright Consultation (2009) 22 I.P.J. 1 at 12ff.
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to support the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement include the
need to preserve by extension in the private contractual sphere the balance between
competing interests that is embedded in exceptions to copyright infringement in the
statutory instrument through which the state confers exclusive rights on copyright
holders. If Parliament believes that copyright holders’ exclusive rights need to be
constrained for the benefit of copyright users in specific instances, the scope of
copyright holders’ proprietary rights should not be extended at copyright holders’
own discretion, in particular in the case of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. Commentators including Ian Hargreaves recommended that exceptions to
copyright infringement in the UKCDPA be made mandatory to ensure greater legal
certainty.250 By clarifying that exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory
would not only ensure greater legal certainty at the statutory level, it would also
provide greater legal certainty and uniformity on a transaction per transaction level,
giving rise to greater efficiency in the market place.251
There are difficulties with the proposition that freedom of contract and copyright holders’ flexibility in how they exploit their exclusive rights justifies overriding the application of exceptions to copyright infringement. First, freedom of contract is for the greater part non-existent in the case of non-negotiated standard enduser agreements which are increasingly present in the commercialisation of copies
of copyright works in consumer markets.252 Second, the flexibility to exploit copyright works needs to be understood within the scope of the exclusive rights that are
conferred by Parliament to copyright holders by the CCA. Exceptions or users’
rights are by definition outside the scope of those exclusive rights. Exceptions to
copyright infringement serve a specific purpose for the benefit of designated users
or users in general. Agreeing that copyright holders may override the application of
exceptions to copyright infringement is conceding that they may by their own volition (particularly in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements) expand the
scope of the exclusive rights conferred and carefully delineated by Parliament.
Whether we should allow copyright holders to override exceptions to copyright infringement (whether in negotiated or non-negotiated agreements) brings us
back to the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement that I investigated earlier
in this article.253 If exceptions are rights, should users be able technically to transfer them, trade or waive them to the same extent that copyright holders do with
their exclusive rights? There are at least two reasons why putting exceptions on an
equal footing with copyright holders’ exclusive rights is problematic. First, because
250

Hargreaves, supra note 161 at 51. See also Lucie Guibault, “Accommodating the
Needs of iConsumers: Making Sure They Get Their Money’s Worth of Digital Entertainment” (2008) 31 J. Cons. Policy 409 at 421ff.
251 The argument of legal certainty can also be invoked to support that copyright statutes
clearly specify that exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory. In such
case, each commercial transaction would give rise to the uncertainty of whether the
exception to copyright infringement prevails or whether it has been overridden by contract. Thus, the argument of greater legal certainty has more strength to support the
proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement should be mandatory as this
would give rise to one uniform scenario: exceptions to copyright infringement prevail.
252 See the discussion in Part 3.(c), above.
253 See the discussion in Part 4.(a), above.

AMBIGUOUS NATURE OF COPYRIGHT USERS’ RIGHTS

43

an important function of exceptions to copyright infringement is the defence component in case of alleged infringement, is that aspect a tradeable commodity?254
Second, to treat exceptions as tradeable commodities assumes that users would be
aware that they are giving something up, i.e., something that is outside copyright
holders’ exclusive powers and privileges to begin with. In reality, it is unlikely that
non-negotiated standard terms and conditions for the commercialization of copyright works will notify users of their rights and on the status of the clauses overriding them.255 From a copyright policy perspective, the highly probable absence of
knowledge of users in what they would be giving up at the time they conclude the
transaction to access copyright works indicates the need for a different analysis
depending on whether the contract is negotiated and whether there are asymmetries
of bargaining power that need to be acknowledged and taken into account in regulating the effects of copyright holders terms of use on exceptions to copyright
infringement.
If exceptions to copyright infringement need to be interpreted from the perspective of users as stated in Bell Canada and Alberta, how does that inform the
determination of their mandatory nature? What are the functions of exceptions in
the overall copyright framework? Can we achieve the intended goals when exceptions to copyright infringement may be overridden by copyright holders, especially
in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements? By conceding to a diluted version
of Parliament’s intent to address the interests of copyright users, i.e., one that is
subject to non-negotiated contracts, are we effectively letting the public down on
the actual scope of the users’ rights, the list of which was expanded with the 2012
amendments to the CCA?256
In Canada, while the nature of exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive
rights has been characterized as “rights” by CCH, their nature as such and scope
remain uncertain, even more so with the 2012 amendments to the CCA that added
the legal protection of TPMs. As I argued above, the legal protection of TPMs
effectively institutes a hierarchy of users’ rights. The mandatory nature of those
rights is also uncertain. In the spirit of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on
users’ rights, and based on the differential treatment between exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA, a reasonable argument may be made that they are
mandatory in some cases, at least with respect to one of the two categories of users’
rights explored here and when the contract that interferes with those rights is a nonnegotiated standard end-user agreement.257
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See Radin, supra note 92 at 168-170 who argues that intellectual property user rights
should not be fully alienable in the context where “boilerplate” can “achieve widespread cancellation of user rights” which “contributes to democratic degradation.”
255 See the discussion on a sample of non-negotiated standard terms of use for online copies of copyright works in Part 3.(c), above.
256 See CMA, supra note 1, Preamble. As Radin, supra note 92 at 40 observes, referring to
the U.S. Copyright Act as an example: “When firms can easily divest recipients of
entitlements that are part of a legislative regime arrived at only with much difficulty,
debate and compromise, it makes a sham of the apparatus of democratic governance.”
257 E.g., under the fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly
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5. CONCLUSION
The 2012 amendments to the CCA and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
users’ rights give an unprecedented place to the interests of copyright consumers
and other users in copyright law. They provide a response and, to some extent, a
counterweight to the progressive expansion of copyright. To explicitly detail in a
statute specific exceptions to copyright infringement, may offer a greater safeguard
to protect the interests of users relative to the unnamed, by default allowances that
copyright users have as a result of the scope of copyright holders’ exclusive rights.
At the same time, a closer examination of the nature, scope, and mandatory nature
of copyright enumerated exceptions or users’ rights in Canada reveals an overly
complex web of interactions between the CCA, TPMs and contracts, that undermines the very existence of users’ rights as we have come to describe exceptions to
copyright infringement since CCH.258 The less than certain nature of copyright
users’ rights in the CCA is a somewhat desolate situation in light of the recent wave
of Supreme Court jurisprudence that displays a greater attentiveness to interests
competing with the exclusive rights of copyright holders, i.e., the interests of users
and the public.259 The unclear nature of users’ rights brought on by the loose ends
of their interactions with TPMs and contracts provides a less cheerful perspective
on the recent major amendments to the CCA that give place more than ever before
to individual users and consumers.260
The constraints that are permitted or not disallowed on users’ rights in the
CCA, leading to questions about their true nature and scope, are not mere academic
questions. In addition to leaving consumers in an undesirable state of legal uncertainty and exposing them to increased risk of litigation,261 the permitted constraints
on their rights dictate to a large extent how copyright holders and intermediaries
develop their business models and their offerings to consumers.262 The unsettled
nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, or the so-called users’ rights, has
rippling effects on the scope of copyright consumers’ rights to commercial copies
of copyright works as a whole. As an important legal basis to delineate copyright
consumers’ rights, the CCA’s uncertain rendering of users’ rights can also have a
rippling effect on the effective support that property and consumer law offers with
respect to copyright consumers’ claims to commercial copies of copyright works.
The legal landscape of copyright consumers is a maze: the paths of users’
rights include many dead ends. What Parliament created and gave to consumers, it
also gave explicit allowance to copyright holders to take back from them, or turned
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introduced non-commercial user-generated content rights, as they are discussed in Part
2 and in Part 4.(b)(i) and (c) of this article.
Supra note 3.
Théberge, supra note 14; CCH, supra note 3; Bell Canada, supra note 5; Alberta,
supra note 5; CRTC, supra note 5.
See the discussion in in Part 2 and Part 4 of this article.
See Hargreaves, supra note 161 at 51.
On a related idea, see Liu, “Enabling Copyright Consumers” (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 1099, where the author describes how clearer affirmation of users’ rights would
support the lawfulness of copyright content intermediaries’ act which in turn enable
and offer greater support to copyright consumers.
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its head away from copyright holders’ ability to do so. Of the four new user provisions, three may be explicitly overridden by TPMs. This compromises significantly
their status as rights and makes their mandatory nature less likely. As to other exceptions to copyright infringement, their nature and scope as rights are debatable
and so is their mandatory nature. With all these questions in mind, the so-called
copyright users’ rights, even when they apply, do not provide much solace to copyright consumers because of all the instances when they may not be applicable and
the legal uncertainty that results therefrom.

